Preliminary Thoughts on the Triple Talaq Case

The Supreme Court is presently considering the legal validity of triple talaq under Muslim personal law. According to reports, yesterday, the Centre filed its affidavit before the Court, stating that triple talaq violates gender equality and women’s dignity, and also that “no undesirable practice can be elevated to the status of an essential religious practice.”

While I do not have access to the Centre’s affidavit, the phrase “essential religious practice” appears to have been used in response to the Muslim Personal Law Board’s affidavit, which, inter alia, sought protection for triple talaq under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In my view, this indicates a line of argument which would take the Supreme Court down the wrong path, and ought to be resisted. The use of the phrase “essential religious practice” (as has been discussed many times on this blog) is an integral part of the Supreme Court’s religious freedom jurisprudence under Articles 25 and 26, and acts as a threshold test for according constitutional protection to religious practices. Conceptually, however, triple talaq does not come within the category of practices that fall within the scope of Articles 25 and 26.

There are two reasons for this. The first is based in precedent. In Narasu Appa Mali, the Bombay High Court held that personal laws (which had not been codified under a statute) were not to be tested on the touchstone of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Singh vs Mathura Ahir. Article 25 of the Constitution expressly states that “subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.” If personal laws fell within the scope of Article 25, therefore, they would be “subject to other provisions of [Part III]”. At the same time, as per Narasu Appa Mali and Krishna Singh, personal laws are exempt from Part III scrutiny. In its counter-affidavit, therefore, the Muslim Personal Law Board rests its case upon two legal prongs that are contradictory. It cannot say that personal laws are exempt from Part III scrutiny, and simultaneously argue that they are protected by Articles 25 and 26.

The proposition that personal laws do not fall within the scope of Articles 25 and 26 is further buttressed by the debates during the framing of the religious freedom clauses. As Ambedkar famously argued, in a speech that we have discussed often on this blog:

“The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill. I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession, should be governed by religion.”

I focus on succession, because marriage – like the law of succession – belongs in the domain of personal law (i.e., the law that is based upon the personal status of the parties) which, as Ambedkar pointed out, was never meant to be protected by Articles 25 and 26. This, along with Narasu Appa Mali and Krishna Singh, makes it clear that the issue of whether triple talaq is an “essential religious practice” under Islam is irrelevant to the present enquiry, and the Court should refrain from going into a question that will – yet again – make it the arbiter of religious doctrine (note, in particular, that the Centres affidavit seems to argue that any religious practice that runs counter to constitutional principles cannot, by that reason, be called an “essential religious practice”. This is an interesting legal fiction to press before the Court – and the Court is no stranger to adopting such legal fictions – but it remains a highly problematic one, for reasons that have been extensively discussed before.)

There are, of course, other avenues open to the Court. While issuing notice, the Court called triple talaq a “customary” practice. In Madhu Kishwar vs State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that customary laws would be subject to Part III (while personal laws remained exempt). However, the distinction is superficial at best, and furthermore, if – as in Narasu Appa Mali – bigamy under Hindu traditions was held to fall within the domain of personal law, then it is unclear how triple talaq will not fall within personal law. Another option would be to import the “essential religious practices” test from Article 25 into the domain of personal law, on the basis that personal law, like claims under Article 25, pertains to religion. This, however, would be a somewhat odd innovation sixty-three years after Narasu Appa Mali, especially in light of the fact that the Bombay High Court, in that case, applied the essential practices test specifically while adjudicating under Articles 25 and 26, and refrained from applying it in holding that personal laws were not subject to Part III.

I would suggest, therefore, that under existing constitutional jurisprudence, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, being bound by Krishna Singh, cannot invalidate triple talaq. Of course, that is not dispositive of the issue. The judgment in Narasu Appa Mali was controversial, and there are strong legal and constitutional arguments against its reasoning. Anirudh Krishnan, for instance, persuasively argues that Narasu was incorrectly decided (see, also, the comprehensive debate between Anirudh Krishnan and V. Niranjan, in the comments section of the same post). Perhaps, then, in 2016, it is time a Supreme Court bench of three judges reviewed Narasu and Krishna Singh, and overruled them as incorrectly decided.

In my view, there is no doubt that triple talaq is an unconstitutional practice, and should be judicially invalidated. However, the Supreme Court ought to refrain from the temptation of repeating its mistake in the Make-Up Artists Case, and riding roughshod over existing precedent in order to achieve a progressive outcome. There is a correct and constitutional way of doing this, which is to refer the case to a three-judge bench, which can then re-examine the question of whether personal laws are subject to Part III of the Constitution, and correct its earlier errors on this score.



Filed under Equality, Sex Equality

7 responses to “Preliminary Thoughts on the Triple Talaq Case

  1. This is not directly related to the case, but involves a recent decision of the Supreme Court. This is the one whereby the Supreme Court expands the definition of ‘cruelty’ to include forcing a son to stay away from the parents. What seems to be problematic here is the obiter of this case, and I quote this from the judgment,

    “A son, brought up and given education by his parents, has a moral and legal obligation to take care and maintain the parents, when they become old and when they have either no income or have a meagre income.”

    While I get the moral aspect, how does the Court source a legal obligation to take care of parents ? It is only the obiter here, but it seems to be another instance of judicial over-enthusiasm. Your inputs here would be appreciated.

  2. In my opinion, personal laws have to be subject to the guaranteed fundamental rights in part III of the Constitution and a larger Supreme Court Bench needs to correct course on this issue. How can personal law be exempt from scrutiny for violating fundamental rights?
    But the Center’s submission that tripe talaq violates the equality and dignity of women and is an undesirable practice is cursory and not very creative. The Court should discuss in detail exactly how and why triple talaq violates the fundamental rights of Muslim women.

  3. Hi!

    There’s an article in the NLSIR, that argues Narasu was incorrectly decided. However, the author moves for incorrect premise that personal law outside the scope of Article 13 includes codified personal law. He proceeds from this premise, to provide counter-examples where judiciary has adjudicated the constitutionality of certain personal laws– Harvinder kaur and Saroja Rani (Constitutionality of restitution of conjugal rights).


  4. I did some quick and probably incomplete research and reading based on this
    Some thoughts:
    Nasaru is only a Bombay High Court decision so it is not precedent for the Supreme Court.
    The Supreme Court in Sant Ram versus Labh Singh did not decide the issue as to whether or not personal laws are subject to Part III.

    In Shri Krishna Singh versus Mathura Ahir, this issue is cursorily mentioned and disposed off in a single paragraph which states:
    “It would be convenient, at the outset, to deal with the view expressed by the High Court that the strict rule enjoined by the Smriti writers as a result of which Sudras were considered to be incapable of entering the order of yati or sanyasi, has ceased to be valid because of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. In our opinion, the learned Judge failed to appreciate that Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws of the parties. In applying the personal laws of the parties, he could not introduce his own concepts of modern times but should have enforced the law as derived from recognised and authoritative sources of Hindu law, i.e., Smritis and commentaries referred to, as interpreted in the judgments of various High Courts, except where such law is altered by any usage or custom or is modified or abrogated by statute.”

    The Supreme Court in Shri Krishna Singh does not even discuss this crucial constitutional issue, no reasons are given, and it simply states (incorrectly in my view) that Part III of the Constitution does not affect personal laws.
    So it would appear as if the issue as to whether or not personal laws are subject to scrutiny under all of Part III for violation of fundamental rights is not by any way settled law and the issue is still open for the Supreme Court to decide. I might be missing some relevant judgments, but in any case, the only correct thing would be for a larger Supreme Court Bench to unambiguously clarify that all personal laws are subject to the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights in Part III.
    May this was too sensitive a topic in the 1950s and 1960s, but such a declaration will not be controversial today. In any case, the language and spirit of Part III makes this the only correct position in law. This will also be in line with modern conceptions of human rights.
    Religious scriptures written and practices developed centuries ago when there was no concept of basic human rights, when it was culturally appropriate to treat lower castes and women as lesser human beings, cannot be allowed to continue to violate fundamental human rights guaranteed by Part III merely by calling them personal laws.

  5. typo alert in my previous comment – should read “Maybe this was too sensitive a topic in the 1950s and 1960s …”.

  6. Pingback: The Uninformed Debate Over The Uniform Civil Code | Live Law

  7. Pingback: Preliminary Thoughts on the Triple Talaq Case — Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy – LAW SCHOOL LEARNERS

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s