Guest Post: Reasonable Accommodation in the Hijab Case – A Double-Edged Sword

[This is a guest post by Chiranth Mukunda.]

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Introduction

On March 3^rd, the Supreme Court said that it would take a call to list the Karnataka Hijab case. Partly because of the frustration with the ERP test, which discounts agency, and partly because of the opportunity the case provides to develop the law on other constitutional grounds, a considerable amount of debate has shifted to Articles 14 and 15 (equality) and freedom of speech (Article 19), and away from Article 25.

Previously, on this blog, many authors have argued for adopting the principle of reasonable accommodation in support of their case for  allowing female Muslim students to wear hijab along with their uniform (see here, here, and here). These arguments tend to focus on the principle of reasonable accommodation in these scenarios:

1. While applying proportionality as a limitation analysis for restricting symbolic expression i.e., to consider the reasonableness of the restriction under Article 19. This argument goes as follows: The necessity (third) prong of proportionality requires the state to adopt the least restrictive measure to achieve a legitimate goal. Therefore, if the hijab as a form of symbolic speech grounded in constitutional rights can be reasonably accommodated along with the uniform, the restriction will be disproportionate. (here)
2. To make a case of indirect discrimination based on adverse effects (here). This goes as follows: the facially neutral policy of wearing a uniform has a disproportionate burden on female Muslim students, and the consequent failure to provide reasonable accommodation constitutes a case of indirect discrimination. What is important to highlight here is that indirect discrimination also involves proportionality analysis. Presently, disparate impact on a group can be justified if it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, failure to establish this by the respondent makes a case of indirect discrimination.

In his split judgment, Dhulia J finds the situation in the hijab case analogous to the situation in the Bijoe Emmanuel case, which he considers a “guiding star which will show us the path laid down by the well-established principles of our Constitutional values, the path of understanding and tolerance, which we may also call as reasonable accommodation.” What is to be noted here is that reasonable accommodation is formulated as mere tolerance, a magnanimous concession from the majority, rather than a matter of right. This way of reasoning presupposes objectionable conduct (objection component) which is then to be balanced by the acceptance component i.e., the reasons to transcend the objection component, which are given by constitutional values. This is not a problem with the framing by the judge, but as I show below, it is inherent in the very concept of accommodation. Alternatively, as a matter of right, constitutional values negate the very first step of the conduct being considered objectionable.

Indian jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation is not fully developed, even in the cases of disability rights where it is explicitly applied as a principle, and its application to sex and religious discrimination cases is vague. In addition to its relative infancy in these areas, there is an inherent limitation to its application, more so when sex and religion are the subject matter than disability. It gets more complicated when sex and religion are entangled, as in the hijab case. I argue that, when discrimination is systematic and institutional, engrained in the system of domination, having temporary gains in the form of reasonable accommodation belies the transformative purpose of the non-discrimination guarantee.

In this essay, I will first, briefly set out the principle of reasonable accommodation as recognized by the Supreme Court; second, highlight the drawbacks of the principle by showing its assimilative tendencies; and third, consider its application along with the adverse effect claim and the consequent limitations of that line of enquiry.

The principle of reasonable accommodation: cuts both ways.

Recognition of the principle by the Supreme Court

Sandra Fredman advocates for a multi-dimensional approach to substantive equality to liberate it from a formulistic approach. Each of these dimensions might be overlapping, but what it essentially does is to provide an “analytical framework” for achieving substantive equality. These four dimensions are:

First, redressing disadvantage: it aims to break the cycle of disadvantage associated with status;

Secondly, redressing stigma, stereotyping, and humiliation;

Thirdly, the participative dimension: participation in society both socially and politically;

Fourthly, accommodating difference and structural change; not exacting conformity as a price for equality.

In the fourth dimension, structural change sits uneasily with accommodation. Rather than being complementary to each other, it is argued that the idea of accommodation hinders structural change. The accommodation principle has also been called the ‘difference approach’ for its link to the sameness/difference framework of formal equality. Also to be noted is the potential for ‘accommodation’ to negatively affect the second dimension by furthering stigma and stereotyping.

In recent years, the Court has with increasing frequency opined that the general equality guarantee set out in Article 14 is not limited to formal equality, but is a  more substantive guarantee linked to remedying patterns of disadvantage for a group/class suffering systematic discrimination. In the NALSA case, the Supreme Court held that:

…equality not only implies preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against unfavorable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws) but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation.

A similar concept was advanced in cases like Jeeja Gosh and Vikash Kumar, where the Supreme Court applied the principle of reasonable accommodation as a ‘substantive equality facilitator’. In the area of disability rights, “the concept of reasonable accommodation entails making necessary and appropriate modifications and adjustments so long as they do not impose a disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case to persons with disability.” (see here)

What is implicit in the need for making appropriate modifications and adjustments is that in some situations it might be appropriate to retain the norm while making exceptions, and accommodating differences whenever the cases arise. Prof. Sandra Fredman gives an example that “when Sikhs are unable to wear a hard hat on a construction site because of their religious duty to wear a turban, the creation of an exception is preferable to the wholesale rejection of the rule” (see Canadian case Bhinder vs CN). In this scenario, it might be intuitively preferable to keep the norm while accommodating “difference”, but in complex scenarios where the norm itself needs to be challenged, the principle suffers from serious limitations. In such scenarios, to effectuate systematic change, it requires the wholesale rejection of the norm, rather than carving out exceptions. I will come to this point later in the piece.

One size does not fit all

While the principle of reasonable accommodation is explicitly recognized in cases dealing with disability rights, there is a cause for caution in applying the same principle in cases the of gender and religion in diverse societies because of its assimilative tendencies and capacity to reinforce stigma and stereotype. As Chandrachud J recognized in Vikash Singh, the principle of reasonable accommodation in disability rights is an individualized principle, and what is reasonable might require case-to-case analysis, because the extent of disability varies from individual to individual. What needs to be highlighted is that the same principle cannot be applied in all cases with different identities and contexts. Although the peculiarity of each individual case of disability might necessitate individual enquiry, this doesn’t imply structural change is unnecessary in other disability rights cases. Nevertheless, on balance individualized assessment in religion and gender cases has the potential to hinder structural change.

Reasonable accommodation as ‘second class version of equality’

The problem with this principle is inherent in the plain words ‘reasonable and ‘accommodation’. To start with, what does ‘reasonable’ mean? Does it mean some type of cost-benefit analysis? Or a proportionality/balancing approach? Chandrachud J in Vikash Singh observed:

Reasonable accommodation demands departure from the status quo and hence ‘avoidable complications’ are inevitable. The relevant question is whether such accommodations would give rise to a disproportionate or undue burden.

If this is the case, then the dignity of the individual is forsaken when the person’s right to equality in a substantive sense is subject to the burden that falls on a duty-bound person. If mere inconvenience to society can act as a cause to limit freedom, what is the worth of freedom anyway? Further, ‘accommodation’ implies that the power to define social interactions remains with the dominant group, while those who fall on the wrong side of it are burdened to challenge it. The likelihood of the challenge to succeed is contingent on accommodation being feasible for the other party. These lines by Brodsky and Day capture the essence of the exceptionalist aspect of reasonable accommodation:

It does not challenge the imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism, able-bodyism and sexism, which result in a society being designed well for some and not for others. It allows those who consider themselves “normal” to continue to construct institutions and relations in their image, as long as others, when they challenge this construction are “accommodated… In short, accommodation is assimilationist.  Its goal is to try to make “different” people fit into existing systems.

Essentially, the principle of reasonable accommodation entails that “powerful and the majority adapt their own rules and practices, within the limits of reason and short of undue hardship, to permit realization of these ends.” While the exclusive norm is a socially constructed barrier acting as a restraining factor with an unequal burden on disadvantaged classes; the ability to change this is dependent on the new norm not causing undue hardship to the powerful and majority.

Another side of the same coin: a link to formal equality

Catharine Mackinnon, in the context of gender discrimination, highlights the problems with reasonable accommodation. In the formal equality approach, there are two types: those who are ‘same’ and those who are ‘different’. It entails treating likes alike and making exceptions to those who are different. This sameness-difference framework implies that there is a dominant category that is normal, and those under it should be treated the same, while those who are relatively different from it are considered ‘abnormal’, a deviation from the norm. Thus, accommodations should be made to bring them close to the norm. She writes, “…man (the dominant norm) is the measure of all things…and our equality judged by our proximity to him.” Hence, by treating the status quo as standard and accepting its norms as neutral, reasonable accommodation does not challenge the dominant social structure but merely carves out exceptions in the language of “special privilege”. Therefore, substantive interpretation of the right to equality should avoid the language of special or preferential treatment, but reasonable accommodation does not seem far from taking us back to formal equality.

Adverse effect and corresponding duty to accommodate: Limitations

Indirect discrimination/adverse effect in the hijab case

When a facially neutral policy or practice, in operation, adversely and disproportionately affects a protected group, a prima facie case of indirect discrimination is made out. The burden is on the respondent to prove that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This implies that, under  the existing framework, indirect discrimination is justified or excused as opposed to direct discrimination on a protected ground, which needs an explicit statutory enabling provision (like 15(3)). What is important to note here is that whether the practice is directly or indirectly discriminatory has a substantial bearing on the line of enquiry, justifications offered, and the outcome of the case. It also determines the degree of oversight, deference, and seriousness with which the judge will look into the matter. Hence, it is important to configure the underlying basis of distinction.

Let’s focus on the word ‘neutral. Because a particular practice or policy is neutral on its face and generally applicable, the form of the impugned measure is not challenged, but the effect of the policy is examined. But a deeper analysis will show that what is neutral is itself a product of structures and norms created by the majority. Institutionalized expression of these norms makes them looks like innocuous facts, but they are nothing but “generalized descriptions of those who are the dominant and traditional participants in a particular institution, and of the conditions that will best support them.”

An example (like the one here, with modifications) will clarify the point. Suppose a school has a calendar specifying holidays throughout the year, which were originally based on the mainstream festivals of the dominant religion. Now the rule applies neutrally and equally to all students in the school who are made up of a diversity of faiths and beliefs. In this scenario, can we call the calendar neutral because of its general application? Now when this ‘neutral’ calendar conflicts with religious observances of non-dominant religions, this supposedly becomes a case of adverse effect discrimination and casts a duty on the school authorities to reasonably accommodate non-dominant faiths subject to undue burden. There is an additional caveat. Now suppose the school authorities oppose accommodation, citing secularism as a value to be upheld and reasoning that it is justified to not accommodate because, say, it may lower the morale of students in a secular institution (I do not consider the difference of positive and negative secularism here for the sake of simplicity). It’s hard to miss the irony here, as the original norm was itself a product of a traditionally dominant structure, whereas now minority groups are merely to be accommodated, short of causing undue hardship, which is now subject to secular values. Cultural life forms of the dominant group are in sync with the social structure, but those with distinct cultural identities and forms of life are disadvantaged in the same structure. Here, striking down the rule might be more appropriate than making minor exceptions in the form of reasonable accommodations.

The point is that whether to strike down the rule causing adverse effects on a disadvantaged group or make accommodations is a choice that must be made. A rigid distinction between direct and indirect discrimination will offer remedies that are short on structural change and fail to reach the true goal of substantive equality, i.e., remedying structural disadvantage. The above-mentioned scenario might have struck a chord with its readers for its similarity with the situation in the hijab case. Simply put, the uniform was designed and implemented, ignoring the possibility of someone wearing a hijab going to the institution. Naturally then, it becomes a clear case of direct discrimination based on protected grounds. So, the broader point is that “neutral” rules are not as innocuous as they may seem, they conceal the seriousness of the violation behind a veil of neutrality.

The shaky distinction between adverse effect and direct discrimination:

In the landmark Canadian case of Meiorin, the Supreme Court of Canada held that:

 …the assumption that leaving an ostensibly neutral standard in place is appropriate so long as its adverse effects are felt only by a numerical minority is questionable: the standard itself is discriminatory because it treats some individuals differently from others on the basis of a prohibited ground, the size of the “affected group” is easily manipulable…

Further, it held that the distinction between adverse effect discrimination and direct discrimination is unrealistic and leaves room for abuse. Seldom is the discrimination open, like “no female Muslim students here”. The court then considers the malleability of the distinction:

… a rule requiring all workers to appear at work on Fridays or face dismissal may plausibly be characterized as either directly discriminatory (because it means that no workers whose religious beliefs preclude working on Fridays may be employed there) or as a neutral rule that merely has an adverse effect on a few individuals (those same workers whose religious beliefs prevent them from working on Fridays).

Its reasoning was that-distinction between these two approaches “may serve to legitimize systemic discrimination” and give a standard drafted in neutral language “an undeserved cloak of legitimacy”; and on reasonable accommodation , the court opined:

Although the Government may have a duty to accommodate an individual claimant, the practical result of the conventional analysis is that the complex web of seemingly neutral, systemic barriers to traditionally male-dominated occupations remain beyond the direct reach of the law. The right to be free from discrimination is reduced to a question of whether the “mainstream” can afford to confer proper treatment on those adversely affected, within the confines of its existing formal standard. If it cannot, the edifice of systemic discrimination receives the law’s approval. This cannot be right.

The court, then adopted a uniform approach to both direct and indirect discrimination because it considered that the “classification ill-serves the purpose of contemporary human rights legislation.”

Before this judgment by the Canadian Supreme Court, direct discrimination had a higher standard of review, which required the impugned measure to be “reasonably necessary” to the stated legitimate goal, whereas indirect discrimination merely required rationality review. Since Meiroin, the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in Canada has no practical utility since the same analytical framework applies to both types of discrimination. Contrast this with India, where the place of indirect discrimination itself is still unclear. Some have located it in the manifest arbitrariness test or in the classification test of Article 14, while others have suggested that Article 15 challenge can include both direct and indirect discrimination. A judicial resolution of this dilemma is needed because Article 15(1) is of the nature of constitutional prohibition, whereas Article 14 involves an analysis of reasonableness.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the above discussion was to show that an artificial distinction between direct and indirect discrimination solely based on neutrality or general applicability of the standard needs to be reconsidered, because it gives undue legitimacy to the rule causing an adverse effect on protected grounds.

Indirect discrimination and accommodation: eschewing exceptionalist remedies.

Considering all the above-mentioned points, if the court frames the issue as one of adverse effects, it is more likely that the rule will stay, and accommodation, subject to reasonableness will be added. Considering this, Joan Williams in this paper explains how the standard structure of wage labour is male centric, structured without taking into account childcare activities, which are disproportionately done by women i.e., an ideal worker is defined as someone who follows a male pattern of life. Women are predominantly disadvantaged in this structure, they may either choose part-time work or a lower-paying job with relatively lesser benefits. One way to remedy this is to recognize the disparity in childcare responsibilities and afford special protections to women who are burdened as a result as a result of unequal childcare responsibilities. This will be hailed as a substantive equality measure which has taken account of social realities. This way, the structure of male-centric wage labor remains, but those who are disadvantaged are going to be ‘accommodated’. This is what Williams argues against.

She makes a case for protecting not only women but “anyone who has eschewed ideal worker status to fulfil child-care responsibilities.” The measure should be sex-neutral, not gender-neutral. (see here, for more) This type of remedy avoids exceptionalist measures, while still being grounded on social realities. This way, the problem faced in the South African Constitutional Court case of Hugo can be overcome. Hence, meaningful change requires changing the entire structure of ideal wage labour, and not simply making accommodations.

Thus, the accommodation approach has the potential to reinforce existing presumptions about what is considered ‘normal’. In the Nitisha judgment, Chandrachud J opined:

The duty of constitutional courts, when confronted with such a scheme of things, would not just be to strike down the discriminatory practices and compensate for the harm hitherto arising out of   them, but also structure adequate reliefs and remedies that facilitate social re- distribution by providing for positive entitlements that aim to negate the scope of future harm.

Evidently, reasonable accommodation fails to meet this criterion of substantive equality. If ‘social redistribution’ that ‘negate[s] the scope of future harm’ is what substantive equality seeks to achieve, using the means of individualized principle like reasonable accommodation in gender and religious discrimination cases is inadequate for the stated purpose.

Conclusion

In cases of adverse effects or indirect discrimination, the duty to reasonably accommodate, in the nature of an exception, is less of a duty than a way to escape liability. If the transformative purpose of our Constitution is to be achieved, we need to make the concept of ‘inclusiveness’ central to our approach while remedying class/group disadvantage. Inclusiveness does not only demand that ‘difference’ to be accommodated but also mandates dismantling existing social hierarchical norms and to deinstitutionalize ‘difference’. This does not mean non-recognition of ‘difference’ but would rather mean eliminating the unfavorable social consequences attached to the ‘difference’ by reducing the role ‘difference’ plays in organizing social life.

Altogether, the principle of reasonable accommodation is innocent in its foundation. It seeks to achieve inclusiveness, but it should be noted that it is not inclusive enough. Proponents of substantive equality should be wary of ad hoc approaches like reasonable accommodation while what is needed is a fundamental shift. As Brodsky and Day note, “…minority rights version of accommodation does not require the powerful and the majority to work with others, on an equal footing, to devise new rules and practices that will better serve all the groups in a diverse population.” Treating disadvantaged groups as equals requires abandoning the language of special treatment/privilege and looking for genuine equality.

To sum up, the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in the hijab case should be reconsidered; adverse effect discrimination should not preclude considering the legitimacy of the rule; the choice to strike down the rule or apply the principle of reasonable accommodation should be dependent on the context, identity of the affected parties, and the nature of the rule; the numerical strength of those affected by an apparently neutral standard, whether a single person or a group, should be irrelevant when considering the decision to strike down the rule or allow it to stand, as long as discrimination is made out on a protected ground(s).

Between Agency and Compulsion: On the Karnataka High Court’s Hijab Judgment

It is an old adage that the manner in which you choose to frame a question will decide the answer that you will choose to give yourself. In today’s judgment by the Karnataka High Court upholding a ban on the wearing of the hijab within classrooms, that giveaway can be seen at page 39 of the judgment, where the Full Bench frames four questions for consideration. The second question reads: “Whether prescription of school uniform is not legally permissible, as being violative of petitioners Fundamental Rights inter alia guaranteed under Articles, 19(1)(a), (i.e., freedom of expression) and 21, (i.e., privacy) of the Constitution?“

It is notable that the Court asks itself a question that nobody else had asked, and indeed, nobody could ask, given how absurd it is: whether a school uniform is itself unconstitutional. But that framing allows the Court to elide the fundamental argument before it – i.e., that the wearing of the hijab alongside a school uniform is consistent with the broader goals of constitutionalism and education – with the sanctity of the uniform itself. A close reading of the judgment reveals how the uniform haunts the Court’s imagination on every page, topped off by the extraordinary remark on page 88, where the Court says that “no reasonable mind can imagine a school without a uniform.” The unarticulated premise of the judgment is that the claim to wearing the hijab is a claim against the very idea of a school uniform, and that allowing the former would destroy the latter. Respectfully, this elision leads the Court into misconstruing and misapplying a range of settled constitutional principles, and for those reasons, the judgment ought to be overturned on appeal.

Introduction

First, a quick summary: the Court’s decision to uphold the ban on the hijab rests upon three constitutional grounds. The first is that the wearing of the hijab does not constitute an “essential religious practice” under Islam, and is therefor not insulated from the regulatory power of the State (pp. 53 – 79, pp. 85 – 87); secondly, that to the extent that wearing the hijab is an aspect of the freedom of expression, or the right to privacy, the ban is reasonable restriction upon the exercise of those rights (pp. 88 – 112); and thirdly, as the Government Order under challenge is facially neutral and non-sectarian (i.e., does not single out the hijab), there is no unconstitutional discrimination against Muslim women students (pg. 96).

Essential Religious Practices

I do not want to spend too much time on the first argument. I have written before why framing the argument in terms of the essential religious practices test is unsatisfactory, both in general, but also specifically in this case, not least because it strips Muslim women of any agency in the matter, and essentially argues that the wearing of the hijab is not a matter of choice (no matter how situated, complex, or otherwise messy the context of that choice may be), but is objectively compelled by the tenets of Islam. Additionally, there is nothing particularly noteworthy about the Court’s analysis of this point, either way: surveying the sources (in particular, the Qur’an), the Court finds that the Petitioners have failed to prove that wearing the hijab is essential to Islam – i.e., that is is mandatory, non-optional, and that Islam would lose its identity if women did not wear the hijab. Under the essential religious practices doctrine, these are broadly the parametres of the analysis (leave aside the fact – as most people have pointed out – that neither the Court, nor external commentators, are particularly well-placed to conduct this analysis). Having established this, the Court is therefore able to hold that, as a matter of religious freedom, the right to wear the hijab is not insulated from State regulation.

There is, of course, a problem with the analysis in that it effectively denies to the Muslim women the ability to frame their argument as one of religious choice, and requires, instead, for them to argue in the language of religious compulsion. This is particularly ironic when we think of the right as the “right to religious freedom”; the blame there, however, lies squarely with the essential religious practices test, as it has evolved over the last seventy years, and it is clear that there is no way out of this hall of mirrors until that test is overruled.

Freedom of Expression and Privacy

Let us now come to the argument where, in my respectful submission, the Court’s analysis is mistaken. Previously, on this blog, it has been argued that the freedom of expression and the right to privacy are important rights implicated by this case. To sum up the argument in brief: as held by the Supreme Court in NALSA v Union of India, dress can, on certain occasions, and depending upon the context, be a form of “symbolic expression” that is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution (why it should be treated as such in this case has been argued in the linked posts). The application of the right to privacy – in terms of decisional autonomy – is also evident. Note that the freedom of expression and privacy arguments are not cleanly separable from the religious freedom arguments: indeed, it could well be – in certain cases – that the very reason why wearing the hijab is a form of symbolic expression is because it is worn as a defence of a beleaguered identity.

Once the rights to freedom of expression and privacy are triggered, the analysis moves to restrictions, where the test of proportionality applies. Proportionality requires, among other things, that the State adopt the least restrictive method in order to achieve its goals. Thus, where something less than a ban would suffice, a ban is disproportionate. The proportionality framework provides the broad intellectual scaffolding within which multiple jurisdictions across the world, as well as India in the NALSA judgment, when dealing with cases involving dress codes and uniforms, have adopted the test of reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation requires the Court to ask whether, in a setting where a certain default exists, a particular claim for departing from that default, founded in constitutional rights, can be reasonably accommodated by the State (or private party), without the activity in question losing its character. In case of the hijab, the claim for reasonable accommodation is straightforward: that the wearing of the hijab (especially hijab that is the same colour as the uniform and is simply draped, like a shawl, over the head) can be reasonably accommodated alongside the uniform, without damaging or in other ways vitiating the overall public goal of education.

How does the Court respond to the argument? The reasoning is somewhat scattered in different parts of the judgment, but drawing it all together, this is how the Court’s argument goes:

1. Dress is not at the “core” of free expression and privacy rights, but is a “derivative” right, and therefore weaker (page 99).
2. The classroom is a “quasi-public space”, where the operation of rights is weaker (page 100).
3. Given (1) and (2), and given the overriding salience of the uniform in a classroom, the proscription of the hijab is reasonable.

With respect, this analysis is flawed. It is true that in US jurisprudence – such as the O’Brien judgment – visible manifestations of expression (such as clothing) can be regulated by the State; however, that is in the context of the American First Amendment, which in cases of State restriction upon speech, is more or less “absolute”. O’Brien only says that where you move from speech to visible manifestation, that “absolute” protection goes. However, in a proportionality-focused jurisdiction such as ours, whether speech is verbal or a visible manifestation, the test remains the same. This flows from the Naveen Jindal case, where the flying of the Indian flag was held to be protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Secondly, it is unclear what exactly the concept of a “quasi-public space is”, since the Court does not undertake a genealogy of the phrase. At one point, it lists “schools, courts, war rooms, and defence camps” (page 104) as examples of quasi-public spaces, and you really have to wonder what on earth unites a classroom and a defence camp; but in my view, it is in any event a misreading of the NALSA judgment to argue that the salience of symbolic expression diminishes in a “quasi-public space”. Indeed, whether it is the public sphere or the quasi-public sphere, the whole purpose of recognising a right to symbolic expression – as manifested through dress – is to recognise that our “public” is diverse and plural, and that diversity and plurality (as long as it does not violate anyone else’s rights) is to be affirmed and not censored.

But it is the final part of the analysis where, in my view, the main error lies. The Court’s response to the reasonable accommodation claim is that the hijab cannot be accommodated because it would deprive the uniform of its uniformity. At page 107, it notes that:

The object of prescribing uniform will be defeated if there is non-uniformity in the matter of uniforms.

But that is patently circular: by definition, the doctrine of reasonable accommodation assumes the existence of a default uniformity, and argues that the default is insufficiently accommodating of a diverse and plural society; what the reasonable accommodation (and proportionality) analysis requires of the Court is to ask whether accommodation is such that it would undermine or otherwise destroy the purpose for which the default rule exists in the first place: which, in this case, is the purpose of education. The crucial error the Court makes is that it sanctifies the uniform instead of sanctifying education; instead of looking at the uniform as instrumental to achieving the goal of an inclusive and egalitarian right to education (and which would, therefore, require accommodation where accommodation would better serve that goal), it treats the uniform (and its associated values of sameness, homogeneity etc) as the goal itself. Thus, by mixing up levels of analysis, the Court’s proportionality and reasonable accommodation analysis is constitutionally incorrect. And the root of this error – as I have pointed out above – is the Court’s assumption that education is uniform – that “no reasonable mind can imagine a school without a uniform.”

Where the Court does attempt to move the analysis to education itself, its conclusions are suspect. For example, on page 96, it notes that by creating “one homogenous class”, the uniform “serves constitutional secularism.” But this is inconsistent with the Court’s own analysis in a previous part of its judgment, where it notes that the Indian concept of “positive secularism” does not require the proverbial “wall of separation” between religion and State, but is much more accommodating towards religious pluralism within the overarching public sphere. On page 97, the Court holds that the Petitioners’ argument that “the goal of education is to promote plurality … is thoroughly misconceived.” But the Court provides no citation or source that the goal of education – note, not the goal of a uniform, but the goal of education – is uniformity at the cost of pluralism. On page 101, the Court quotes this argument again, and this time – regrettably – chooses to ridicule it instead of engaging with it, noting that it is “hollow rhetoric” and redolent of the “oft quoted platitude” of “unity in diversity”. Ironically, after ridiculing this as a platitude, the Court immediately afterwards cites the Supreme Court judgment in Re Kerala Education Bill that uses the exact same phrase!

Even more ironically, in the same paragraph, the Court then cites the UK House of Lords judgment in Regina v Governors of Denbigh High School, where, in paragraph 97 of her speech, Lady Hale notes that “a uniform dress code can play its role in smoothing over ethnic, religious, and social divisions.” Unfortunately, however, the Court omits to cite what Lady Hale goes on to note in paragraph 98, which is this:

It seems to me that that was exactly what this school was trying to do when it devised the school uniform policy to suit the social conditions in that school, in that town, and at that time. Its requirements are clearly set out by my noble and learned friend, Lord Scott of Foscote, in para 76 of his opinion. Social cohesion is promoted by the uniform elements of shirt, tie and jumper, and the requirement that all outer garments be in the school colour. But cultural and religious diversity is respected by allowing girls to wear either a skirt, trousers, or the shalwar kameez, and by allowing those who wished to do so to wear the hijab. This was indeed a thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the complexities of the situation.

The judgment of the UK House of Lords in Denbigh High School, indeed, is a model of exactly the kind of analysis that the Karnataka high Court steadfastly sets its face against in its hijab judgment: Denbigh involves an extensive discussion about how schools in plural and diverse societies should accommodate difference instead of insisting upon uniformity; and the correct question to ask – which is always a contextual question – is at what point does reasonable accommodation tip over into a demand that is inconsistent with the goals of education (in Denbigh, it was the wearing of the jilbab). It is therefore somewhat extraordinary that the Court cited the judgment in support of its ruling, when the very next paragraph after the paragraph it cited explicitly noted that the wearing of the hijab in a school was a good example of reasonable accommodation!

In fact, the Denbigh judgment is an excellent example of why the fear that really seems to be animating the Court’s judgment is no fear at all. On page 105, the Court notes:

An extreme argument that the students should be free to choose their attire in the school individually, if countenanced, would only breed indiscipline that may eventually degenerate into chaos in the campus and later, in the society at large.

But nobody – nobody – ever really advanced this “extreme argument.” Denbigh in fact shows that it is actually fairly straightforward – and well within the domain of judicial competence – to examine cases on an individual basis, and draw principled lines based on context. Trotting out a hypothetical parade of horribles to deny a constitutional right is not good judicial practice.

Indeed, the fact that the Court is itself fully capable of drawing these distinctions when it wants to is made abundantly clear by the next case that it discusses: the South African judgment in MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal (discussed in previous blog posts), where the controversy involved the wearing of a nose-stud by a Hindu student. The Court distinguishes the case on the basis that “the said case involved a nose stud, which is ocularly insignificantly (sic), apparently being as small as can be.” (p. 108) Now in my respectful view this distinction is quite bogus (more on this below), but that is not the point I want to make here: the point I want to make is that the “extreme argument” that the Court articulates – where everyone would ask to choose their own attire, and there would be general chaos – is an argument that it doesn’t even seem to believe in itself, given how easily – almost facilely – it distinguishes between the hijab and the nose-stud.

Non-Discrimination

Earlier on this blog, detailed arguments were made about how the hijab ban violates the constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination. The Court addresses this argument very briefly, noting only that the proscription – based on the Government Order – was facially neutral and non-sectarian (pg. 96). Unfortunately, while this argument applies to direct discrimination, it does not apply to indirect discrimination, where facially neutral rules and regulations have a disproportionate impact on different people. The doctrine of indirect discrimination has long been accepted by the Supreme Court, and is therefore part of Indian jurisprudence.

In fact, it is the Court’s own analysis – in particular, its distinguishing of the South African case – that shows how indirect discrimination is squarely applicable to the present case. The Court’s distinction between the “ocularly insignificant” and (presumably) the “ocularly significant” is a classic example, in discrimination law jurisprudence, of a “facially neutral rule” (which, in the Court’s reading, would allow “ocularly insignificant” adornments to a uniform, but not others) that has a disproportionate impact, in this case, grounded at the intersection of religion and burden. In my respectful view, the Court’s failure to consider this ground at all provides another compelling reason for why this judgment should be set aside on appeal.

Addendum: A Case of Conscience

From pages 80 to 88, the Court undertakes a brief analysis of that forgotten cousin of the freedom of religion – the freedom of conscience. The main judgment, of course, is the iconic Bijoe Emmanuel case, where the right of the Jehovah’s Witnesses not to participate in the singing of the national anthem was upheld. The Court distinguishes Bijoe Emmanuel on two grounds. First, it argues that “conscience is by its very nature subjective. Whether the petitioners had the conscience of the kind and how they developed it are not averred in the petition with material particulars.” This is not entirely unreasonable, and perhaps offers valuable guidance to future cases (and indeed, this case on appeal). If indeed one is making a claim based on the freedom of conscience, then it needs to be specifically pleaded, with the acknowledgment – of course – that conscience is subjective. For example, an anti-war activist can refuse conscription by arguing that war conflicts with their pacifist beliefs – but they do have to spell that out in specific terms. In this case, perhaps, it may be necessary for the petitioners to spell out, perhaps in more concrete terms, the (subjective) reasons for wearing the hijab as a case of conscience – an argument that, of course, overlaps with the argument from symbolic expression.

What is less convincing is the Court’s attempt to show that Bijoe Emmanuel was not a case of conscience at all, but one of religious freedom, despite the fact that Bijoe Emmanuel specifically uses the phrase “matters of conscience.” It is important to note that conscience might flow from religious convictions (for example, I may be a pacifist because I am religious), but it need not do so. In that way, the clean-cut separation that the Court attempts between conscience and religious freedom is, in my respectful view, unsustainable – and might materially have altered the outcome of this case.

Conclusion

There are two important things to note, by way of conclusion.

The first is that the Court is explicit that its judgment applies to classrooms (i.e., not even school premises, but classrooms). It notes this specifically on page 124, after some rather (in my view) unfortunate remarks about how banning the headgear is emancipatory “for women in general, and Muslim women in particular”: it notes that:

It hardly needs to be stated that this does not rob off the autonomy of women or their right to education inasmuch as they can wear any apparel of their choice outside the classroom.

The scope, thus, is limited to classrooms.

Secondly, for the reasons advanced above, I believe that the judgment is incorrect, and should be overturned on appeal. It is incorrect for the following reasons: first, it mistakenly holds that the rights to freedom of expression and to privacy are diminished, or derivative, in this case; secondly, it misapplies the reasonable accommodation test, and does not show how allowing the hijab for those who choose to wear it, as a uniform accessory, is incompatible with the goal of education; thirdly, it fails to consider that the ban amounts to indirect discrimination against Muslim women; and fourthly, it wrongly elides freedom of conscience and religious freedom. This creates an overarching framework of reasoning where the sanctity of the uniform is placed above both the goals of education, and the exercise of constitutional rights. I submit that a correct calibration calls upon us to recognise that educational spaces in a plural and diverse society ought to reflect its plurality and diversity, and facilitating the freedom of choice and expression is one crucial way to achieve that. Such an approach is more consistent with our Constitution.

Lt. Col. Nitisha vs Union of India: The Supreme Court Recognises Indirect Discrimination

[Editor’s Note: Justice is an indivisible concept. We cannot, therefore, discuss contemporary Supreme Court judgments without also acknowledging the Court’s failure – at an institutional level – to do justice in the case involving sexual harassment allegations against a former Chief Justice. This editorial caveat will remain in place for all future posts on this blog dealing with the Supreme Court, until there is a material change in circumstances.]

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In early 2020, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Babita Puniya, holding that the Indian Army’s policy of denying women officers a permanent commission [“PC”] was discriminatory. Following this judgment, the Union Government put into place a procedure for the grant of PCs to eligible women officers. The results of this process – that involved 615 eligible women officers – spurred a second round of litigation before the Supreme Court. In a judgment delivered yesterday, Lt. Col Nitisha vs Union of India, the Supreme Court – speaking through a bench of Chandrachud and Shah JJ – held that the implementation of the Babita Puniya judgment had also been discriminatory. In particular, the importance of Lt. Col. Nitisha lies in the fact that the criteria for grant of PCs to women were facially neutral, but found to be indirectly discriminatory. This marks the first occasion that the Supreme Court has categorically held indirect discrimination to violate the Constitution, and set out an account of what indirect discrimination entails.

As in Babita Puniya, the facts of the case are somewhat complicated, and this post must necessarily present a somewhat schematic account. Broadly, there were three contentious criteria of assessment for the grant of PC: first, that the women officers had to clear a certain percentage score, as well as score higher than the lowest scoring male officer who had been awarded a PC; secondly, that Annual Confidential Reports [“ACRs”] were to form part of the grading; and thirdly, certain medical requirements had to be fulfilled.

On the face of it, these criteria were neutral, i.e. they did not, on their face, discriminate between male and female officers. On digging a little deep, however, it was found that the very fact that for all these years, women had not been eligible for the grant of PCs, had a direct bearing on some eligible candidates’ failure to fulfil the criteria. For example, ACRs were prepared with a view to recommendations for the grant of a PC. Given that female officers had not been eligible for PCs, in their case, the reports were more lackadaisical than those of their male counterparts; these were also affected by the fact that women officers had not applied for a range of opportunities, or courses, that were supposed to be considered in the ACRs. This was because their career options had hitherto been blocked – thus, effectively, leading to a cycle of discrimination that now meant that they applied with relatively unfavourable ACRs. Similarly, with respect to the medical criteria, the Court found that male officers took their medical tests at the time they applied for PCs (and once granted PCs, they were not required to maintain the same levels of fitness). However, female officers – who had been ineligible all these years – were now required to prove the very level of fitness that otherwise similarly situated male officers were no longer required to prove (as they had been granted PCs many years before).

Of course, other than the requirement of scoring higher than the lowest-scoring male candidate, none of the eligibility criteria required any facial comparison between women and men. For this reason, the Supreme Court was required to reach further, and articulate an alternative model of equality and discrimination. It did so by drawing a distinction between intention and effect, and discrimination wrought by individual acts on the one hand, and by the impersonal workings of institutions and structures on the other. Chandrachud J. held that the concept of substantive equality – to which the Constitution was committed – required accounting for both systemic and indirect discrimination (paragraph 45). After an extended comparative examination (paragraphs 51 – 65), Chandrachud J. held that the two-step test for discrimination evolved in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Fraser (discussed on this blog here) was the most appropriate. The Fraser test – as set out by the Supreme Court – requires that:

First, the Court has to enquire whether the impugned rule disproportionately affects a particular group. As an evidentiary matter, this entails a consideration of material that demonstrates that “membership in the claimant group is associated with certain characteristics that have disadvantaged members of the group”. However, as such evidence might be hard to come by, reliance can be placed on evidence generated by the claimant group itself. Further, while statistical evidence can serve as concrete proof of disproportionate impact, there is no clear quantitative threshold as to the quantum of disproportionality to be established for a charge of indirect discrimination to be brought home. Equally, recognizing the importance of applying a robust judicial common sense, the Court held: “In some cases, evidence about a group will show such a strong association with certain traits—such as pregnancy with gender—that the disproportionate impact on members of that group will be apparent and immediate” … Second, the Court has to look at whether the law has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage. Such disadvantage could be in the shape of: “[e]conomic exclusion or disadvantage, [s]ocial exclusion…[p]sychological harms…[p]hysical harms…[or] [p]olitical exclusion”, and must be viewed in light of any systemic or historical disadvantages faced by the claimant group.” (para 65)

The Court also noted that while statistical data would aid in establishing a finding of indirect discrimination, it would not necessarily exist in every case (paragraph 68); and that while due deference ought to be accorded to employer arguments around suitability criteria for the job, the Court would have to be vigilant to avoid endorsing the same stereotypes or generalisations that were responsible for the discrimination in the first place (paragraph 70). Effectively, the Court indicated that it would have to check whether the employer had acted proportionately – ensuring, for example, that there were no other measures that could have been taken that did not have the same discriminatory effect. The Court correctly noted, as well, that structural discrimination would often require structural remedies (paragraph 73).

Applying this analytical framework to the case at hand, indirect discrimination was easily made out. It was the very fact that female officers had been formally denied a set of opportunities for all these years, that now ensured that a seemingly neutral set of criteria – neutral in that the same set of criteria was applied to eligible male candidates – was discriminatory in effect (note that the female candidates were not competing against male candidates in this case, so this judgment also shows that a finding of discrimination does not need a comparator group). The quality of the ACRs, the limited consideration of awards or achievements attained only as on the 5th or 10th year of service, and so on, were all indications of this. Thus, as Chandrachud J. pointed out: “A formalistic application of pre-existing policies while granting PC is a continuation of these systemic discriminatory practices. WSSCOs were continued in service with a clear message that their advancement would never be equal to their male counterparts.” (para 96). The same was the case with the medical fitness criteria, as explained above: while there was nothing wrong with the criteria per se, it was their application that was indirectly discriminatory. Female officers, who were not eligible for PC for all these years, were asked to pass a medical test now that their similarly situated male counterparts had been entitled to take at a substantially younger age (and then not required to maintain). Thus the Court held:

The WSSCOs have been subject to indirect discrimination when some are being considered for PC, in their 20th year of service. A retrospective application of the supposedly uniform standards for grant of PC must be modulated to compensate for the harm that has arisen over their belated application. In the spirit of true equality with their male counterparts in the corresponding batches, the WSSCOs must be considered medically fit for grant of PC by reliance on their medical fitness, as recorded in the 5th or 10th year of their service. (para 112)

While the facts of this case are undoubtedly complex, it will be easy to see what the Court was trying to remedy by looking at another similar case, but with much simpler facts. In Australian Iron and Steel Co v Bankovic, a company imposed a “last in, first out” retrenchment policy (i.e., you got retrenched based on how short a time you spent in the company). It turned out, however, that the company had only recently begun to employ women, and that therefore, the retrenchment policy was much more likely to target women, simply for this reason. This was found indirectly discriminatory. Thus, this was the sequence: first, there was formal and direct discrimination, that put women at a disadvantage. Then, formal discrimination was ended, but criteria were put in place that failed to account for that prior disadvantage – and thus ended up entrenching and perpetuating it, indirectly. In a very similar way, in this case, for the longest time, women faced formal and direct discrimination by not being eligible for the grant of PC. This formal discrimination was struck down by the Court in Puniya – but the policy that was framed for implementing it failed to account for the disadvantage that had been caused (directly) all these years. Thus, by the very fact of its “neutrality”, the policy was indirectly discriminatory.

Of course, not all such examples of indirect discrimination will be as clean-cut – that is, effectively piggybacking off former direct discrimination. Importantly, however, as we have seen above, Chandrachud J.’s formulation was detailed enough to address those more complex cases when they do arise. The proof of the pudding is, of course, in the eating, but for now Lt Col Nitisha’s Case marks an important advance in its acknowledgement, recognition, and articulation of indirect discrimination under the Indian Constitution.

 

Notes from a Foreign Field: The South African Constitutional Court on the Rights of Domestic Workers

Last week, the South African Constitutional Court handed down an important judgment concerning the rights of domestic workers. In Mahlangu v Minister of Labour, the question before the Court was whether the exclusion of domestic workers from South Africa’s social security law – the COIDA – was unconstitutional. The Court unanimously answered that it was. The majority judgment, in particular,  repays careful study, as it advances constitutional jurisprudence in relation to inter-sectionality, indirect discrimination, and dignity, in important directions.

In this post, I do not consider the challenge based on Section 27 of the South African Constitution, that guarantees the right to social security. I will consider, instead, the equality and dignity challenges.

Equality and Non-Discrimination

It was argued that the blanket exclusion of the entire class domestic workers from the scope of the COIDA violated the right to equal treatment, and amounted to unfair discrimination against them, in contravention of Section 9 of the South African Constitution. As far as the right to equal treatment went, the government conceded the case at the bar, and the Court therefore returned a finding that the exclusion of domestic workers was irrational and served no discernible legislative goal.

Let us focus, therefore, on the unfair discrimination argument, centred around Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution. Section 9(3) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on a number of familiar grounds (race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, and so on). “Domestic work” is not a listed ground under Section 9(3), and so this was not a case of direct discrimination. The Court found, however, that the exclusion constituted a case of indirect discrimination:

… because, as the applicants and amici submit, domestic workers are predominantly Black women. This means discrimination against them constitutes indirect discrimination on the basis of race, sex and gender. (para 73)

Note, however, that race, sex and gender are multiple grounds. This, therefore, took the Court into the concept of inter-sectionality, which it defined as the acknowledgment that “that discrimination may impact on an individual in a multiplicity of ways based on their position in society and the structural dynamics at play.” (para 76) Consequently:

It is undisputed between the parties that domestic workers who are in the main Black women, experience discrimination at the confluence of intersecting grounds. This simultaneous and intersecting discrimination multiplies the burden on the disfavoured group. (para 84)

It was evidently clear, therefore, that (a) a predominant number of domestic workers were black women, and (b) black women were located at intersecting axes of discrimination. This is what set apart the exclusion of domestic workers, as opposed to the exclusion of defence forces or the police (who, in any event, had access to other social security schemes):

Multiple axes of discrimination are relevant to the case of domestic workers. Domestic workers experience racism, sexism, gender inequality and class stratification. This is exacerbated when one considers the fact that domestic work is a precarious category of work that is often undervalued because of patronising and patriarchal attitudes. (para 90)

Indeed, in this case, as the Court observed, the reason why domestic workers were predominantly black women was itself founded at the intersection of racial and gender discrimination, at the time of apartheid:

The combination of influx control laws and the migrant labour system also had a particularly onerous effect on Black women. Taken together, they restricted the ability of Black women to seek and obtain employment opportunities, thus rendering them dependent on absent husbands or sons. Essentially, this all sedimented a gendered and racialised system of poverty, that was particularly burdensome for Black women. (para 98)

Consequently, their present exclusion from COIDA amounted to nothing more than a continuation of the same intersectional discrimination (para 100). For this reasons, the Court therefore held that the right against unfair discrimination had been breached.

Dignity

The Majority’s dignity analysis was very interesting. In brief, it noted that the reason why domestic work, alone, had been excluded from the protective scope of the COIDA was because it was not considered to be “real work”, as traditionally understood. This attitude towards domestic work was rooted in patriarchal assumptions. As the Court noted, therefore:

Historically, in varying contexts across the world, domestic work has generally not been regarded as real work and has been undervalued for that reason. In the American context, it has been argued that the historical undervaluation of domestic workers stems primarily from the gendered and racialised nature of those who have traditionally done this work, namely African-American women. To this end, domestic work there has been undervalued for two reasons. First, it has been described as work done by a “despised race”. Second, it has been regarded as “women’s work” or a “labour of love” having no economic currency. (para 110)

This, when combined with the exploitation built into domestic work, therefore made it clear that “the exclusion of domestic workers from COIDA is an egregious limitation of their right to dignity, alongside its infringements on their other constitutional rights. It extends the humiliating legacy of exclusion experienced during the apartheid era into the present day, which is untenable.” (para 115)

Analysis

The Constitutional Court’s judgment highlights the importance – and indeed, the indispensability – of paying close attention to context in any equality and discrimination-oriented examination. The Court’s inter-sectionality and dignity analysis was rooted in context – both the historical context that was responsible for compelling a disproportionate number of black women into domestic work, and the continuing context of how intersecting axes of disadvantage worked against them. Grounding domestic workers’ exclusion within this context was what allowed the Court to find that there existed both indirect and inter-sectional discrimination, as well as a violation of dignity.

The judgment is also important because – if we bracket the Section 27 analysis – what was at issue was not discrimination in its traditional sense (such as, say, different pay for men and women), but that legislation had not extended its benefits to a discrete category of work (domestic work). Historically, Courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of protective laws simply on the basis that certain categories are not within their scope, as that has been considered to be a matter of policy. The Constitutional Court’s application of the discrimination and dignity framework, however, dispensed with any such objections, as the very fact of exclusion was grounded within clear constitutional prohibitions.

This is important for a third reason: labour law – with its inclusions and exclusions – has often been considered to be an autonomous domain, with constitutional principles exercising weak scrutiny, at best. The Constitutional Court’s judgment demonstrates how rigorously testing labour law upon the touchstone of the Constitution will ensure that the rights of the most vulnerable are not left to the mercy of arbitrary legislative classifications (whether it was the exclusion in this case, or otherwise artificial definitions of “employees” or “employment relationships”, which equally serve to limit access to labour rights).

The advances made by the Constitutional Court in the domain of inter-sectionality, indirect discrimination, and dignity, are worthy of emulation. In 2018, in Navtej Johar, the Supreme Court gestured towards inter-sectionality, and various High Courts have tentatively begun to articulate the concept indirect discrimination. It remains for the Courts to firmly embed these concepts into our equality and discrimination jurisprudence. It is also crucial for Courts to make clear that labour law is a critically important terrain for actualising constitutional values, and that differential or discriminatory access to labour rights raises serious constitutional concerns. Here again, the judgment of the South African Constitutional Court shows the way.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notes from a Foreign Field: Developing Indirect Discrimination – Bringing Fraser to India [Guest Post]

[This is a guest post by Gauri Pillai.]

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Article 15(1) prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen ‘on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them’. The Supreme Court, in the now infamous Nergesh Meerza, read Article 15(1) to mean that discrimination should not be made ‘only and only on the ground of sex’ but could be made ‘on the ground of sex coupled with other considerations.’ On the one hand, the ‘on ground only of…sex’ test functions to bring in a requirement of intention to discriminate. The presence of a reason for discrimination—say, to protect women—operates as an ‘other consideration’, bringing the rule outside the scope of the non-discrimination guarantee, even if the effect of the rule is to disadvantage women (see here). Discrimination in thus understood to mean intentional, individual acts of prejudice tied to the ‘moral blameworthiness’ of actors. There is no recognition that ‘such prejudices are frequently embedded in the structure of society’, the ‘unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules’: in other words the ‘everyday practices of a well-intentioned society’, beyond the conscious coercive actions of a ‘tyrannical power’ alone.  On the other hand, the ‘on ground only of…sex’ test excludes indirect discrimination. Facially neutral rules having an adverse effect on members of a specific group would amount to ‘other considerations’ beyond the listed ground, thus placing such rules outside the reach of Article 15(1) (see here).

However, the Supreme Court trilogy in Sabarimala, Joseph Shine and Navtej Johar offers an alternate reading of the non-discrimination guarantee. First, the scope of Article 15(1) was extended to ‘institutional and systemic discrimination against disadvantaged groups’, thereby tackling ‘structures of oppression and domination’ excluding members of these groups from full and equal social, economic, political and cultural participation (Chandrachud J., concurring opinion, Sabarimala, paragraph 117 and Joseph Shine, paragraph 38). Thus, there was a shift towards understanding discrimination in a structural sense. Second, the central enquiry under Article 15(1) was no longer the intention of the discriminator. Rather, the ‘primary enquiry to be undertaken by the Court’ was whether a rule, in form or effect, ‘contributes to the subordination of a disadvantaged group of individuals’ (Chandrachud J., concurring opinion, Joseph Shine, paragraph 38). Finally, the ‘on ground only of…sex’ test was dismissed as a ‘formalistic interpretation’ of Article 15(1), because it failed to recognise the ‘true operation’ of discrimination (Chandrachud J., concurring opinion, Navtej Johar, paragraph 36). Instead of relying on the formal basis of classification—the listed ground ‘plus’ the facially neutral criterion—Article 15(1) was reoriented to focus on the effect a facially neutral rule. In other words, indirect discrimination was recognised, and brought within the scope of the non-discrimination guarantee.

Despite the steps forward, several questions still remain unanswered. How does the recognition of discrimination as a structural phenomenon affect the doctrinal functioning of the non-discrimination guarantee? What is the test for indirect discrimination? How should courts assess the impact of a rule? What forms of impact are relevant? What kind of evidence is suitable and necessary for such impact assessment? Answers to these questions are crucial to enable Courts to apply these concepts going forward. In their absence, these ideas could remain at the level of rhetoric, without translation into doctrine. In this post, I present the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Fraser v Canada—interpreting the non-discrimination guarantee under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter—as offering clear responses to these questions, and thus providing normative and doctrinal guidance for India. However, before I get into discussing the case, it is important to interrogate briefly why a decision from Canada is relevant for constitutional jurisprudence in India: why should India listen to Canada?

Canada offers a helpful comparative because the constitutional function of the non-discrimination guarantees in the Canadian Charter and the Indian Constitution bear significant similarities. As the Court recognises in Fraser, ‘the root of s. 15  is our awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such discrimination should be curtailed’ (paragraph 77). An identical commitment underlies Article 15, the object of which has been identified as guaranteeing protection to ‘those citizens who had suffered historical disadvantage’ by removing their ‘age-long disabilities and sufferings’. This is reinforced by the placement of Article 15 within the ‘equality code’, consisting of Article 16, which permits the State to treat members of disadvantaged groups differently through reservations, offering them ‘real and effective’ equal opportunity for employment; Article 17, which abolishes untouchability to free Dalits from ‘perpetual subjugation and despair’, ‘social inequity, social stigma and social disabilities’; and Article 18 which prohibits an Indian citizen from accepting titles in order to dismantle social hierarchy, or the perceived superiority of some over the other.

Having set out the similarities in the constitutional vision underlying the non-discrimination guarantees in India and Canada, I now turn to Fraser. In 1997, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (‘RCMP’) introduced a job-sharing program to provide its members an alternative to taking leave without pay. Under the program, two or three RCMP members could split the duties and responsibilities of one full-time position, allowing each participant to work fewer hours than a full‑time employee. The petitioners, three female employees of the RCMP, enrolled in the job‑sharing program along with 137 other members. Most participants were women, and they cited unilateral responsibilities for childcare as their reason for joining the program. Ms. Fraser described feeling ‘overwhelmed’ as she tried to balance work and family; Ms. Pilgrim felt like she was ‘on a treadmill’; and Ms. Fox recounted the experience as ‘hell on earth’ (paragraph 7). The RCMP introduced a rule deeming the job-sharing position part-time work for which participants could not receive full-time pension credit. This policy was challenged by the petitioners as having a disproportionate, adverse impact on women, thus violating their right to non-discrimination under Section 15.

The Court began by identifying the shift away from a ‘fault-based’ conception of discrimination towards an ‘effects‑based model which critically examines systems, structures, and their impact on disadvantaged groups’. The shift, the Court observed, was premised on the recognition that discrimination is ‘frequently a product of continuing to do things the way they have always been done’ rather than an intentional, prejudicial act by an individual actor (paragraph 31). In other words, the Court identified discrimination as structural, in general. The Court then set out how parenting is structured socially in Canada. Citing evidence, the Court observed that the public sphere, including the workspace, continues to be built on the male norm, and requires an ‘unencumbered worker’ with no responsibilities of care. At the same time, the private sphere, including the home, continues to be built on the labour of women who unilaterally undertake a major share of parental responsibilities (paragraph 104). In other words, the gendered division of labour, a product of inequality between the sexes, is systemically built into the ‘everyday practices’ of Canadian society. While this recognition is significant in and of itself, how did it influence the claim under the non-discrimination guarantee?

The lower courts rejected the discrimination claim holding that while most employees who lost out on pension benefits due to job-sharing were women, the loss occurred due to the ‘choice’ of the petitioners to job-share. The Supreme Court in Fraser however used the understanding of discrimination as structural—in general and in the specific context of parenting—to contest this notion of ‘choice’. The Court observed that choice should not be assessed as against an ‘autonomous, self-interested and self-determined individual’. Rather, a ‘contextual account of choice’, taking into account the ‘social and economic environments’ in which choices play out is necessary. The Court then applied this contextual understanding of ‘choice’ to women’s decision to job-share. The Court argued that the decision to job-share is far from an ‘unencumbered choice’. Against the structurally unequal institution of parenting, the only available option for women—‘euphemistically labelled choice’—is to opt for forms of accommodation like job-sharing, which are associated with lower wages, fewer benefits, fewer promotional opportunities, and minimal or no retirement pensions. If so, penalising them for this ‘choice’ by denying them pension benefits both punishes them for inequality, and perpetuates such inequality by exacerbating women’s socio-economic disadvantage, and entrenching stereotypes about women as ‘bad employees’ who ‘do not merit or want more responsible, higher‑paying jobs because they will inevitably prioritize family over work’. Thus, the Court highlighted the ‘flaws of over-emphasising choice’ in the Section 15 enquiry: ‘by invoking the “choice” to job‑share as a basis for rejecting the s. 15(1)  claim, the [lower courts] removed the “challenged inequality from scrutiny, effectively taking it off the radar screen so as to circumvent examination of the equality issues at stake”’ (paragraphs 88-92).

This does not imply that in the absence of inequality, women would never opt to job share and spend time with their children. The Court in fact recognised this by holding that ‘differential treatment can be discriminatory even if it is based on choices made by the affected individual or group’. This is because discriminating on ground of certain choices—like the decision to parent—violates human dignity and is thus inherently discriminatory, independent of inequality (paragraphs 86-86). Thus, the decision to parent was implicitly recognised as valuable by the Court, and job-sharing was seen as facilitating the decision by removing the disadvantage associated with it in the employment sphere. However, the Court did not develop this line of reasoning, as it mapped onto a claim of discrimination on ground of parental status which did not need to be pursued in light of the gender discrimination claim (paragraph 114).   

In assessing ‘choice’ in light of the structurally unequal institution of parenting, the Court also recognised the reason why it was women who primarily made the ‘choice’ to job-share:

[a] number of structural conditions push people towards their choices, with the result that certain choices may be made more often by people with particular “personal characteristics”. This is a key feature of systemic inequality—it develops not out of direct statutory discrimination, but rather out of the operation of institutions which may seem neutral at first glance (paragraph 90).

This then brought the Court to the issue on indirect discrimination. It also normatively grounded the recognition of indirect discrimination as a necessary response to the interaction between seemingly neutral rules and prevalent structural inequality. Indirect discrimination, the Court held, occurs when ‘a seemingly neutral law has a disproportionate impact on members of groups protected on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground…Instead of explicitly singling out those who are in the protected groups for differential treatment, the law indirectly places them at a disadvantage’ (paragraph 30). The Court then set out a two-stage doctrinal test for assessing indirect discrimination.

At the first stage, the Court would enquire whether a rule, in effect, creates a distinction on the basis of a protected ground by having a ‘disproportionate impact’ on members of a group within the ground. The Court discussed the nature of evidence that could be used to prove this claim. On the one hand, evidence providing the ‘full context of the claimant group’s situation’ would be useful to demonstrate that ‘membership in the claimant group is associated with certain characteristics that have disadvantaged members of the group’. However, the Court was careful to note that evidence on issues which predominantly affect certain groups may be under‑documented. As a result, claimants may have to rely more heavily on their own evidence or evidence from other members of their group, rather than on government reports, academic studies or expert testimony. On the other hand, evidence—including statistical evidence—about the outcome of the rule, or a substantially similar one, in practice could offer ‘concrete proof that members of protected groups are being disproportionately impacted’. The Court clarified that there is no universal threshold on what level of statistical disparity is necessary to demonstrate that there is a ‘disproportionate impact’. Declining to craft rigid rules, the Court held that it would vary depending on the case. The Court also noted that both kinds of evidence are not always required: ‘in some cases, evidence about a group will show such a strong association with certain traits—such as pregnancy with gender—that the disproportionate impact on members of that group will be apparent and immediate’ (paragraphs 50-72).

Once the petitioner establishes that the rule, in effect, creates a distinction on the basis of the protected ground, the second stage of the enquiry starts. At this stage, the Court asks whether:

the law has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage…The goal is to examine the impact of the harm caused to the affected group. The harm may include “[e]conomic exclusion or disadvantage, [s]ocial exclusion…[p]sychological harms…[p]hysical harms…[or] [p]olitical exclusion”, and must be viewed in light of any systemic or historical disadvantages faced by the claimant group (paragraph 76).

Thus, a focus on impact or effect of the rule is built into both stages of the test: first to determine whether the rule draws a distinction on the basis of a protected ground, and second to assess whether the distinction perpetuates disadvantage and is thus discriminatory. Applying the test to the case at hand, the Court held that the rule denying full pension benefits to job-shares, though facially neutral, had a ‘disproportionate impact’ on women. The Court relied on statistics—from 2010‑2014, all RCMP members availing job-share were women, and most of them cited childcare as their reason for doing so—and other evidence—commission reports, academic work and judicial decisions—’about the disadvantages women face as a group in balancing professional and domestic work… because of their largely singular responsibility for domestic work.’ This evidence, the Court held, established the ‘clear association between gender and fewer or less stable working hours’, and proved that the rule drew a distinction in effect between men and women, satisfying the first stage (paragraphs 97-106). Coming to the second stage, the Court held that the denial of pension benefits to women exacerbates women’s historical disadvantage. It impacts them socio-economically, with evidence suggesting that the feminisation of poverty is linked to the disparities in pension policies. At the same time, it also entrenches ‘a long‑standing source of disadvantage to women: gender biases within pension plans, which have historically been designed for middle and upper‑income full‑time employees with long service, typically male’. In other words, it retains the ‘male pattern of employment’, continuing to construct the public sphere around the male norm. In light of these ‘far‑reaching normative, political and tangible economic implications’ of the rule, it was held to perpetuate women’s disadvantage, and thus discriminate against women (paragraphs 107-113).

Thus Fraser demonstrates, with great clarity, how understanding discrimination as a structural phenomenon translates into the functioning of non-discrimination guarantee. It allows the Court to resist the rhetoric of ‘choice’ which can be used to subvert claims of discrimination. It also offers a compelling normative grounding for the recognition of indirect discrimination. Fraser further lays out a cogent two-stage test for establishing indirect discrimination, indicates the forms of impact that are relevant and describes the nature of evidence which can be used to prove such impact. It therefore provides clear normative and doctrinal guidance to India in developing the constitutional jurisprudence on indirect discrimination.

The Supreme Court’s Muslim Beard Judgment: A Missed Opportunity

Yesterday, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court upheld a Muslim airman’s discharge from the Indian Air Force for keeping a beard. At issue before the Court was Regulation 425 of the Armed Force Regulations, 1964, which prohibited the growth of hair by Armed Forces personnel, except for “personnel whose religion prohibits the cutting of hair or shaving of face.” (425(b)) Although the Court referred to various policy directives issued by the Air Force from time to time, the case ultimately turned on whether the Airman was covered by Regulation 425(b). The Court held that he was not, although its reasoning on the point was rather brief:

“During the course of the hearing, we had inquired of Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants whether there is a specific mandate in Islam which “prohibits the cutting of hair or shaving of facial hair”. Learned senior counsel, in response to the query of the Court, indicated that on this aspect, there are varying interpretations, one of which is that it is desirable to maintain a beard. No material has been produced before this Court to indicate that the Appellant professes a religious belief that would bring him within the ambit of Regulation 425(b) which applies to “personnel whose religion prohibits the cutting off the hair or shaving off the face of its members”.

Since the Court did not go into the question, it remains unclear what manner of evidence would have actually been sufficient to convince it that the airman’s case fell within Regulation 425(b). From the question that the Court put to the airman’s counsel, it appears that it was looking for some kind doctrinal evidence demonstrating that Islam prohibits the cutting of facial hair, regardless of the appellant’s own views on the issue. This is in line with the Court’s “essential religious practices” test, which I have criticised earlier.

However, a distinction needs to be drawn between two kinds of religious claims. Most of the cases that have come before the Court have involved the status of practices that can be broadly understood as group or community practices (for instance, the Supreme Court’s 2004 judgment on whether the public performance of the tandava dance was an essential part of the Ananda Margi sect’s beliefs). Although the essential religious practices test remains deeply problematic, in such cases, it is understandable that the Court might want to look for authoritative sources to ascertain the status of the practice within the religion/sect. However, the present case did not involve determining the status of a community practice – it involved, centrally, an individual’s judgment of what was required by his faith. In such a case, the essential religious practices test seems even less defensible, because effectively, it prohibits any individual departure from the officially sanctioned tenets of the religion. And in such cases, the test that is followed in other jurisdictions, throughout the world – the test that asks merely whether the individual in question had a sincere and genuinely held belief in the validity of the religious claim – seems far more appropriate.

Although the distinction between community-oriented and individual-oriented religious claims has not yet been drawn by the Supreme Court, in my view, a three-judge bench was ideally placed to do it, and to limit the scope of the essential religious practices test. The case, therefore, represents a missed opportunity by the Court to develop its religious freedom jurisprudence in a more progressive direction.

It is also unclear to me why, after having held that Regulation 425(b) was not applicable to the airman’s case, the Court found it necessary to make the following observations:

“The Air Force is a combat force, raised and maintained to secure the nation against hostile forces. The primary aim of maintaining an Air Force is to defend the nation from air operations of nations hostile to India and to advance air operations, should the security needs of the country so require. The Indian Air Force has over eleven thousand officers and one lakh and twenty thousand personnel below officers rank. For the effective and thorough functioning of a large combat force, the members of the Force must bond together by a sense of Espirit-de-corps, without distinctions of caste, creed, colour or religion. There can be no gainsaying the fact that maintaining the unity of the Force is an important facet of instilling a sense of commitment, and dedication amongst the members of the Force. Every member of the Air Force while on duty is required to wear the uniform and not display any sign or object which distinguishes one from another. Uniformity of personal appearance is quintessential to a cohesive, disciplined and coordinated functioning of an Armed Force.”

This was unnecessary, because the argument from uniformity/cohesiveness would arise only if the Court had first found that the airman had a right to keep a beard, and was then assessing whether the Air Force was justified in curtailing the right. As the Court correctly pointed out, Article 33 of the Constitution expressly permits Parliament to modify the application of fundamental rights to members of the Armed Forces – which it did, for instance, through Regulation 425. Consequently, the Court’s enquiry should have begun and ended with Regulation 425 (where, I have tried to show, it ought to have applied a different test).

Additionally, the questioning of balancing rights, in such cases, is a complex one, and requires a more detailed analysis than what the Court undertook. In some jurisdictions, for instance, a distinction is drawn between ostentatious or very visible religious markers of identity, and more innocuous ones; some jurisdictions require employers to demonstrate that their restrictions serve a “bona fide occupational requirement“, and furthermore, are reasonably tailored towards achieving it. Admittedly, after its finding on Regulation 425(b), the Court did not need to address this question; however, it nevertheless chose to do so, in doing so, its observations about unity and cohesiveness unduly simplify a very complex issue.

Furthermore, during the course of its observations, the Court ended up making a statement that is incorrect as a matter of law, but could have unfortunate consequences going forward. Towards the end of its judgment, the Court remarked that:

“Regulations and policies in regard to personal appearance are not intended to discriminate against religious beliefs nor do they have the effect of doing so. Their object and purpose is to ensure uniformity, cohesiveness, discipline and order which are indispensable to the Air Force, as indeed to every armed force of the Union.”

While it is nobody’s case that the regulations intended to discriminate against religious beliefs, it is incorrect to also state that they do not have that effect. The only basis for that claim would be the assumption that religious dicta and personal appearance are entirely separate from each other; a quick look at the core tenets of Sikhism demonstrates that that assumption is false. Indeed, the Court’s reference to “object and purpose” in the next line was itself a statement about legislative intent; but by running together intent and effect, in my view, the Court conflated direct and indirect discrimination in a manner that could stifle the future development of indirect discrimination jurisprudence in India (a concept still in its infancy).

Today: The Supreme Court’s nod to structural discrimination

In a judgment handed down today, the Supreme Court held that the de-boarding of a disabled passenger from a Spice Jet airplane was illegal and violated her rights. It also issued some guidelines with respect to the treatment of disabled persons at airports under existing laws and regulations. In addition, constitutional observers might find certain observations in paragraph 39 to be of interest. Justice Sikri notes:

“…equality is founded upon two complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation. For example, when public facilities and services are set on standards out of the reach of persons with disabilities, it leads to exclusion and denial of rights. Equality not only implies preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation.”

What is striking about this passage is the complete absence of the language of intention/motive in defining discrimination. As we have discussed extensively on this blog before, the dominant approach (with the odd exception) of the Indian Supreme Court towards equality has been to understand the word “grounds” under Article 15(1) [“The State shall not discriminate on grounds only of…”] as qualifying “the State”, and thereby, holding that discrimination exists only if it can be shown that it was the intention, or purpose, of the law to discriminate. This approach is based upon a belief that discrimination is comprised of a set of conscious, intentional, definable, and individual acts.

This, however, is no longer the model followed in many other jurisdictions. Courts now focus upon the effects of government policy or laws, with the understanding that even seemingly neutral norms have the effect of excluding and subordinating people and groups by virtue of the fact that these norms are part of a non-neutral system of structures and institutions.

The underlined portions of the above excerpt strongly endorse the structural, effects-based model. They shift the emphasis from the reasons or motivations governing the discriminatory action, to the right of the discriminated group to enjoy equal access to public goods. And they also place the focus upon remedying systemic discrimination.

While these remain incidental observations of a two-judge bench, it is important to acknowledge that they provide an alternative approach towards equality under the Constitution, with admirable lucidity and clarity. In that sense, today’s judgment is of significance.

The Delhi High Court on Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination

Recently, my attention was drawn to a fascinating judgment of a division bench of the Delhi High Court, delivered last month. Inspector (Mahila) Ravina vs Union of India concerned a challenge to the CRPF’s denial of promotion to a female inspector. The facts are somewhat complex. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Petitioner, an inspector in the CRPF, was unable to attend a Pre-Promotional Course, conducted between July and August 2011, because she was pregnant. Consequently, after her pregnancy was over, she attended the next Course, conducted in July and August 2012, and qualified, thus fulfilling the requirements for promotion to the next-higher post. However, when the CRPF released its promotion list in 2014, the Petitioner’s name was not included, and consequently, she lost her seniority vis-a-vis her batchmates and juniors. When the Petitioner filed a representation before the CRPF, she was informed that she had lost her seniority because of her “unwillingness to attend the promotional course [held in 2011].” The Petitioner challenged this decision before the High Court.

The question before the High Court, therefore, was whether “the Petitioner’s pregnancy would amount to unwillingness or signify her inability to attend a required promotional course and if she is entitled to a relaxation of rules to claim seniority at par with her batchmates.” The Court upheld the Petitioner’s claim on two grounds, both of which merit close attention.

First, the Court held penalising the Petitioner for her pregnancy violated Article 21 of the Constitution. In paragraph 9, Justice Ravindra Bhat observed:

“To conclude that pregnancy amounts to mere unwillingness – as the respondents did in this case- was an indefensible. The choice to bear a child is not only a deeply personal one for a family but is also a physically taxing time for the mother. This right to reproduction and child rearing is an essential facet of Article 21 of the Constitution; it is underscored by the commitment of the Constitution framers to ensure that circumstances conducive to the exercise of this choice are created and maintained by the State at all times. This commitment is signified by Article 42 (“Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief- The State shall provide conditions for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief”) and Article 45 (“Provision for early childhood care and education to children below the age of six years- The State shall endeavour to provide for early childhood care… ”)…”

There are two important points that need to be noted here. The first is that under the Court’s interpretation of Article 21, personal liberty is violated not only through coercive State action, but also State action that puts persons in a position where they must choose between availing a State benefit, or exercising a constitutional right. In other words, if “unwillingness” is to be construed as including absence due to pregnancy, then a woman is put in a position where she has to either forego her promotion, or forego her pregnancy. The State is therefore penalising women who exercise their constitutional rights by withholding the benefit of promotion from them. Readers will note the similarity between the argument here, and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions discussed in the last post. The petitioner’s position here was even stronger, however, because denial of promotion is a more tangible and direct harm than withdrawal of a tax exemption.

The second is the Court’s use of the Directive Principles of State Policy – in particular, Articles 42 and 45. As I have attempted to argue before, a conceptually sound approach towards the DPSPs must respect the fact that the framers chose to make them unenforceable, while finding a textually and structurally relevant role for them in constitutional interpretation. There are two possible ways of doing this. One is that where a legal provision may be reasonably interpreted in two different ways, the interpretation that furthers the Directive Principles ought to be given precedence. The second is that the Directive Principles may be used to provide concrete content to the abstract concepts contained in Part III of the Constitution. In paragraph 9, the Delhi High Court does both. Referring to Articles 42 and 45, it holds that the guarantee under Article 21 is not merely a negative prohibition against coercive State action, but also casts a positive obligation upon the State “to ensure that circumstances conducive to the exercise of this [Article 21] choice are created and maintained by the State at all times.” In the instant case, this concretely translates into prohibiting the State from indirectly penalising a person if they choose to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed right to personal liberty. The Court also uses the DPSPs interpretively, by preferring an interpretation of the word “unwilling” that excludes pregnancy rather than one that includes it.

In its Article 21 analysis under paragraph 9, the Court stresses that pregnancy is a “deeply personal” choice. This is an ideal segue into the second part of the Court’s analysis. In paragraph 12, the Justice Bhat holds:

“It would be a travesty of justice if a female public employee were forced to choose between having a child and her career. This is exactly what the CRPF‟s position entails. Pregnancy is a departure from an employee‟s “normal” condition and to equate both sets of public employees- i.e. those who do not have to make such choice and those who do (like the petitioner) and apply the same standards mechanically is discriminatory. Unlike plain unwillingness – on the part of an officer to undertake the course, which can possibly entail loss of seniority – the choice exercised by a female employee to become a parent stands on an entirely different footing. If the latter is treated as expressing unwillingness, CRPF would clearly violate Article 21. As between a male official and female official, there is no distinction, in regard to promotional avenues; none was asserted. In fact, there is a common pre-promotional programme which both have to undergo; both belong to a common cadre. In these circumstances, the denial of seniority benefit to the petitioner amounts to an infraction of Article 16 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, which guarantee equality to all in matters of public employment, regardless of religion, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence etc. A seemingly “neutral” reason such as inability of the employee, or unwillingness, if not probed closely, would act in a discriminatory manner, directly impacting her service rights.“

There are some crucial points here that need to be unpacked. The first is the express acknowledgment of pregnancy-based discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, which brings it within the non-discrimination guarantees under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. As we discussed recently on this blog, the Supreme Court in Nargesh Mirza’s case (1981), dealt a serious blow to Indian sex discrimination jurisprudence by failing to consider pregnancy on the touchstones of Articles 15 and 16, and instead considering it under the “arbitrariness” prong of Article 14. Bizarrely, in Nargesh Mirza, the Supreme Court held that termination on a first pregnancy would be unconstitutional because arbitrary, but termination on a third pregnancy wouldn’t be (since it helped the nation’s family planning program and helped women become good mothers!). The discontents of the arbitrariness approach under Article 14 are legion, and I do not need to recount them here. The Court’s analysis of pregnancy discrimination under Article 16 represents a significant advance.

What is even more important, however, is how the Court does it. Justice Bhat observes that “a seemingly “neutral” reason such as inability of the employee, or unwillingness, if not probed closely, would act in a discriminatory manner, directly impacting her service rights.” This is the language of indirect discrimination: facially “neutral” provisions have a discriminatory impact because they end up reproducing existing social inequalities and hierarchies. As we have seen in our discussion of the evolution of Indian sex discrimination jurisprudence, indirect discrimination still has only a tenuous hold upon the imaginations of our judges. A large number of cases have chosen to interpret the word “grounds” in Articles 15 and 16 as referring to the reasons, or motives, behind a law, and have consequently refused to find discrimination even when there is a clear case of differential impact. In my analysis of the text of Articles 15 and 16, I advanced an alternative reading of the word “grounds”, one that referred not to the motive of the law, but to the characteristics that were protected from adverse impact (sex, race, caste etc.). An effect or impact-based test was accepted by the Supreme Court in Anuj Garg. However, even in Anuj Garg, the law itself was directly discriminatory: it prohibited women from working as bartenders. The Delhi High Court, however, applies the framework of indirect discrimination to a facially neutral law, which discriminated not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of pregnancy. In this, it follows an analytical tradition, the finest exemplar of which is the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgment in 1983, which struck down the restitution of conjugal rights provision under the Hindu Marriage Act as discriminatory, because of its strongly adverse impact upon women.*

It is also fascinating to note that Justice Bhat places the word “normal” within quotation marks. In the first part of the paragraph, he notes that “pregnancy is a departure from an employee’s “normal” condition…” This reveals the crucial understanding that our intuitive ideas about the existing baseline, the “normal” from which we judge deviations, is a political and social construct. In other words, the “normal” is constructed form the perspective of a privileged subject position. Previously on this blog, I have cited the work of Joan Williams, who makes the point in the context of workplace discrimination:

“... society is structured so that everyone one, regardless of sex, is limited to two unacceptable choices – men’s traditional life patterns or economic marginality. Under the current structure of wage labor, people are limited to being ideal workers, which leaves them with inadequate time to devote to parenting, and being primary parents condemned to relative poverty (if they are single parents) or economic vulnerability (if they are currently married to an ideal worker). Wage labor does not have to be structured in this way… [the recent] massive shift in the gendered distribution of wage labor has produced intense pressures to challenge the assumption that the ideal worker has no child care responsibilities. But this pressure is being evaded by a cultural decision to resolve the conflicts between home and work where they have always been resolved: on the backs of women. In the nineteenth century, married women “chose” total economic dependence in order to fulfill family responsibilities.’ Today, many women with children continue to make choices that marginalize them economically in order to fulfill those same responsibilities, through part-time work, “sequencing,” the “mommy track” or “women’s work.” In each case, the career patterns that accommodate women’s child-care responsibilities often are ones that hurt women’s earning potential.”

The “normal” worker, therefore, being male, is not expected to become pregnant, and consequently, the baseline rules (penalisation for “unwillingness” to attend the promotional course) are constructed from his perspective. It is this edifice of exclusion that the Delhi High Court’s judgment interrogates, and then finds to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

By de-mythologising “normalcy”, the Delhi High Court has made another significant advance towards a jurisprudence of discrimination that is true to the Constitution’s commitment of ensuring social justice. In his dissenting opinion in Volks vs Robinson, Justice Albie Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court observed that “the purpose of constitutional law is to convert misfortune to be endured into injustice to be remedied.” The Constitution guarantees not only formal equality, but also promises that entrenched power structures which, over decades, even centuries of sedimentation, have attained the status of facts of nature, will no longer be treated as immutable in the very existence of things, but as human-caused instances of injustice, and will be dismantled. In a very profound sense, this judgment implements Justice Sachs’ vision of the transformative Constitution.

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(*NB: The case before the Delhi High Court was an easier one than the one before the AP High Court, because while only women can get pregnant, both men and women can invoke the restitution of conjugal rights provision. The AP High Court rested its decision upon the unequal power relations within the family, which would mean that restitution of conjugal rights would adversely impact wives to an enormous degree, while having very little impact upon the lives of husbands. That judgment was reversed in one year by the Supreme Court. Perhaps it was too far ahead of its time. One hopes that thirty years later, as indirect discrimination continues to struggle for a foothold within Indian discrimination jurisprudence, the Delhi High Court has not also committed the error of being far ahead of its time.)

Sex Discrimination and the Constitution – XII: Indirect Discrimination in Sareetha vs Venkatasubbaiah

Before ending our discussion on sex discrimination under the Constitution, it would be interesting to take note of two (overruled) High Court cases that pushed interpretive boundaries in their understanding of Article 15(1). The first is the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Naz Foundation vs NCT of Delhi. As is well-known, the High Court invalidated Section 377 of the IPC, which criminalised “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” (read: homosexuality), on grounds of Articles 14, 15 and 21. One of the things the High Court did was to read “sexual orientation” into the word “sex”. In a guest post last week, Vansh Gupta examined this issue in some detail, so I won’t reiterate the argument in full. Briefly, there are two ways of understanding the Court’s interpretive move. The first – which is what the Court itself seems to say – is that sexual orientation is read into Article 15 as a ground “analogous” to sex. This, I believe, is a mistake, since the text of Article 15(1) makes it clear that the “grounds” stated therein constitute a closed list (compare, e.g., with the anti-discrimination provisions of the South African and Canadian Constitution). However, the other – more acceptable – reading is that the criminalisation of homosexuality constitutes sex discrimination, properly understood. This is because, at its heart, it rests upon the same gender stereotypes (including assumptions about sexual roles) that form the basis of sex discrimination.

Let us now consider the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Sareetha vs Venkatasubbaiah. The constitutionality of S. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which provides for the “restitution of conjugal rights”, was challenged. According to Section 9, “when either the husband or the wife has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply by petition to the district Court for restitution of conjugal rights and the Court, on being satisfied the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.” According to an Explanation, the burden of proving reasonableness lies upon the party who has withdrawn from the society of the other. Under the CPC, a decree under S. 9 may be enforced through attachment of property, or detention in a civil prison.

A full history of this concept would be beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say here that the “restitution of conjugal rights” is a common law doctrine, introduced into India by the British, and the subject of some notorious court battles in the late-19th century, at the dawn of the women’s movement.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court struck down Section 9, primarily on the ground that it violated the right to privacy. The judgment’s conception of privacy is novel and fascinating, and repays close study. What is of particular significance, however, is that towards the end of its judgment, the Court also invalidated the provision on the grounds of Article 14. This seems prima facie counter-intuitive, since Section 9 clearly applies to “the husband or the wife“, and makes no distinction between the two. It is, therefore, facially neutral. The Court observed, however:

“… by making the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights equally available both to wife and husband, it apparently satisfies the equality test. But the requirements of equal protection of laws contained in Article 14 of the Constitution are not met with that apparent though majestic equality at which Anatole France mocked… the question is how this remedy works in life terms.  

In our social reality, this matrimonial remedy is found used almost exclusively by the husband and is rarely resorted to by the wife. A passage in Gupte’s Hindu law in British India’ page 929 (second edition) attests to this fact. The learned author recorded that although the rights and duties which marriage creates may be enforced by either spouse against the other and not exclusively by the husband against the wife; a suit for restitution by the wife is rare”.

The reason for this mainly lies in the fact of the differences between the man and the woman by enforcing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights the life pattern of the wife is likely to be altered irretrievably whereas the husband’s can remain almost as it was before this is so because it is the wife who has to beget and bear a child. This practical but the inevitable consequence of the enforcement of this remedy cripples the wife’s future plans of life and prevents her from using that self-destructive remedy. Thus the use of remedy of restitution of conjugal rights in reality becomes partial and one-sided and available only to the husband. The pledge of equal protection of laws is thus inherently incapable of being fulfilled by this matrimonial remedy in our Hindu society. As a result this remedy words in practice only as an engine of oppression to be operated by the husband for the benefit of the husband against the wife.”

There are two important aspects of this analysis. The first is a factual finding that a facially neutral statute has a disproportionate effect upon a certain class (although one would have liked statistical evidence beyond a quotation from Gupte’s Hindu Law in British India!) The technical term for this is “disparate impact”. The second is that the reason for the disparate impact cannot be linked with any constitutionally justifiable purpose. Here, the Court finds that, in light of the deeply unequal familial power structures prevailing within Indian society, a textually neutral legal remedy operates to the severe disadvantage of women. The two findings together constitute the vice of indirect discrimination (in other jurisdictions, a finding of disparate impact shifts the burden upon the discriminator to show that his or her actions could be justified by a legitimate and proportional purpose).

It is important to acknowledge indirect discrimination as a form of constitutionally proscribed discrimination, since statutes and policies are not always consciously designed to exclude groups and classes. As we have seen before, prejudices can be subconscious or unconscious, and entire exclusionary social and economic structures can be erected without the intention of harm anyone. Anuj Garg’s focus on the effect of policies upon protected groups, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s factual and normative analysis of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, together constitute a powerful foundation from which to place indirect discrimination at the heart of the non-discrimination guarantee.

Two things remain to be noted. The first is that T. Sareetha examined indirect discrimination within the context of Article 14, and not Article 15. The logic, however, remains exactly the same, especially when coupled with the effects test under Article 15. Secondly, Sareetha was quickly overruled by the Supreme Court, which warned against bringing constitutional law into the domestic sphere. Whatever the merits of that ruling, Sareetha is no longer good law. However, much like Koushal and Naz on “sex” and “sexual orientation” under , there was no specific finding by the Supreme Court on the issue of indirect discrimination. Neither of these two propositions, therefore, have been expressly rejected by the Court. As such, their normative power and attractiveness makes them ideal candidates to be adopted in some future time.