[This is a guest post by Rishika Sahgal.]
On Wednesday, 20 April 2022, the homes, shops and stalls of people in Jahangirpuri, Delhi began to be demolished by the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (‘NDMC’). This took place soon after a letter was written to the NDMC by the chief of the BJP Delhi unit, requesting it to mark the ‘illegal construction’ of ‘rioters’, and bulldoze these constructions. The demolitions were halted by the Supreme Court the same day, ordering that status quo be maintained, and the case is currently pending before the Court.
Evictions and demolitions are a common occurrence in India, and this continued unabated even during the pandemic. Evictions targeting settlements where overwhelmingly Muslims work and reside have also taken place on multiple occasions in recent times (Bangalore in 2020; Dhalpur in 2021). The injustice of these demolitions and evictions aside, these are also plainly illegal. In this blog, I recap the jurisprudence on the rights to livelihood, housing and occupation under the Indian Constitution, and especially in Delhi, to establish why the Jahangirpuri demolition drive violates constitutional requirements. I also present the relevant statutory framework to indicate why the demolitions violate statutory rights. I have previously explained the relevant law on this blog, but the time has come to repeat the exercise, in the hope that it makes a difference.
The demolition of homes violates the right to housing and statutory rights
The demolition of homes in Jahangirpuri violates the right to housing under Article 21, and statutory rights.
Notice, hearing, meaningful engagement and rehabilitation under Article 21
In Olga Tellis (1985), a 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court established that the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the rights to livelihood and housing. It recognized 2 sets of entitlements as part of the rights to livelihood and housing – a right to notice and hearing prior to evictions, and access to rehabilitation under existing schemes for the same.
The requirements of notice, hearing and rehabilitation have been further refined and strengthened by the Delhi High Court. In Sudama Singh (2010)the Delhi High Court held that prior to carrying out any eviction, it was the duty of the state to (i) conduct a survey of all persons facing evictions to check their eligibility under existing schemes for rehabilitation, and (ii) to carry out a rehabilitation exercise ‘in consultation with each one of them [persons at risk of an eviction] in a meaningful manner.’ These obligations on the state, and corresponding entitlements for rights holders, form part of their right to housing under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Sudama Singh decision was confirmed twice by the Supreme Court. First, while dismissing as withdrawn a special leave petition filed by the Delhi Government against the decision, the Supreme Court noted that the it had ‘attained finality’ (SLP (Civil) No. 445-446/2012). Second, while hearing an appeal against an order of the Delhi High Court passed in contempt proceedings, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sudama Singh holding, and directed the Government of Delhi to implement it ‘in full measure’ (Civil Appeal Nos. 21806-807/2017). In 2019, the Delhi High Court reiterated the Sudama Singh entitlements in Ajay Maken. The result is that the entitlements of notice, hearing, meaningful engagement and rehabilitation ought to apply in cases of evictions and demolitions across India, and not just in Delhi.
Both Sudama Singh and Ajay Maken have informed the statutory framework for the improvement, redevelopment, as well as removal and resettlement of jhuggi jhopdi bastis in Delhi. The Delhi Slum & JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 framed under the DUSIB Act 2010, prioritises the in situ redevelopment of bastis, and permits removal of bastis built prior to 2006 only for exceptional reasons. The Draft Protocol framed under the Act requires DUSIB to conduct a survey to determine people’s eligibility for rehabilitation, and to carry out rehabilitation through meaningful engagement with residents of bastis, prior to any eviction/demolition exercise.
Notice and hearing under the DMC Act
Notice and hearing are also relevant statutory requirements under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 (‘DMC Act’). This sets out the powers and functions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation, including its trifurcated version of North, South and East Delhi Municipal Corporations, recently unified once again into a single entity that is the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
S 322, read with ss 320 and 321, of the DMC Act permits removals without notice of ‘any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale or other thing whatsoever, placed, deposited, projected, attached or suspended in, upon, from or to any place in contravention of this Act’. Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that demolitions in Jahangirpuri were lawfully carried out under s 322 of the Act. In response, the Supreme Court bench asked the SG that surely the NDMC did not need bulldozers to remove stalls, chairs, and benches! It is quite clear that the NDMC cannot claim to have lawfully carried out the demolition of homes under this provision, because it does not apply at all to the demolition of homes.
S 343 of the Act provides for the demolition of unauthorised buildings, and therefore this provision could apply in the case of unauthorised homes. S 343 is clear regarding the need for notice and hearing prior to demolition:
Provided that no order of demolition shall be made unless the person has been given by means of a notice served in such manner as the Commissioner may think fit, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such order shall not be made…
S 368 of the Act provides for the demolition of buildings that are ‘unfit for human habitation’. S 368 also requires notice and hearing prior to demolition. It states:
Provided that no order of demolition shall be made unless the person has been given by means of a notice served in such manner as the Commissioner may think fit, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such order shall not be made…
The hearing is not envisaged as mere formality, but the statutory scheme requires the MCD to change its mind regarding the need for demolition, if an undertaking is provided during the hearing that the building will be made fit for human habitation.
On a bare reading of relevant provisions of the DMC Act, it is clear that the demolition of homes carried out without provision of notice and reasonable opportunity for showing cause, are a violation of the statute. S 343 of the DMC Act applies to all ‘unauthorised buildings’, and the demolition of ‘unauthorised’ shops in Jahangirpuri without notice violates s 343 of the Act.
It should be emphasised that s 343 applies to unauthorised constructions, and s 368 applies to homes that are not fit for human habitation. These provisions may not apply at all to the homes and shops demolished by the NDMC in Jahangirpuri, because these may not be unauthorised or unfit for human habitation. The reasonable opportunity to show cause would be the most appropriate forum for these determinations to be made through deliberations between the concerned parties – the residents, shopkeepers and the NDMC. The failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard robs everyone concerned the chance to ascertain the circumstances of these homes and shops, and to find the most appropriate solution. I return to the importance of notice, hearing and meaningful engagement in section 4 below.
Protection from eviction and demolition under the Delhi (Special Provisions) Act
Besides jhuggi jhopdi bastis, ‘unauthorised colonies’ in Delhi that existed prior to 31 March 2002, and buildings constructed in these colonies prior to 1 June 2014, are protected from eviction and demolition until 31 December 2023 under the Delhi (Special Provisions) Act, as amended in 2021.
The result is that in case of homes in Delhi, even ‘unauthorised’ or ‘unfit’ homes, no eviction and demolition exercise can take place without provision of notice and hearing prior to eviction, the carrying out of a survey to ascertain eligibility for rehabilitation, and the carrying out of rehabilitation through meaningful engagement with residents. In any case, the Special Provisions Act grants protection from eviction and demolition to homes constructed prior to 2014, and demolition of homes in contravention of this legislation is beyond the authority of the NDMC. The demolition of homes in Jahangirpuri, then, violates these constitutional and statutory requirements.
The demolition of street vending stalls violates constitutional and statutory rights
Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution includes the right to hawking or street vending, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the general public (Article 19(6); Bombay Hawkers Union (1985); Sodan Singh (1989)). An eviction of street vendors restricts their right to carry out their occupation under Article 19(1)(g), and must therefore meet the requirements of Article 19(6) to be constitutionally valid.
The eviction and relocation of street vendors is regulated by the Street Vendor (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act 2014 (‘Street Vendors Act’). It can be argued that this legislation lays down ‘reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public’ to which the right to street vending is subject. It should be noted that the constitutionality of this legislation has not been challenged, and I do not take any view on the matter of its constitutional validity. Until such a challenge, I assume that it is constitutionally valid.
Under the Street Vendors Act, 30 days’ notice must be provided to street vendors prior to an eviction when they possess a certificate of vending (s 18), and they must be relocated as per applicable schemes. All street vendors must be provided 15 days’ notice prior to evictions under the relevant scheme applicable in Delhi (clause 6.4.1).
It must be acknowledged that the scheme permits eviction of street vendors without notice in case street vending causes traffic congestion or ‘law and order problems’ (clause 6.4.1). ‘Law and order problems’ is a notoriously ambiguous phrase capable of many interpretations. It seems to leave untrammelled discretion on the part of public authorities, and may therefore be struck down on grounds of arbitrariness. To maintain the legality and constitutionality of the exception, it must be constructed narrowly. Delegated or subordinate legislation, such as the scheme framed in Delhi under the Street Vendors Act, must not frustrate the requirements of the parent statute; nor can it violate constitutional rights (see Indian Express Newspaper (1984); Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association (1989); P Krishnamurthy (2006)). The parent statute requires notice to ordinarily be provided to street vendors facing evictions (s 18). Therefore, the dispensation of notice and hearing must be exceptional, and terms like ‘law and order problems’ must be constructed narrowly to uphold the vires of the provision of the scheme. In any case, in Jahangirpuri, the street vendors have not been shown to cause traffic congestion nor law and order problems, and therefore cannot be legally evicted without notice. The exception to notice under clause 6.4.1 of the scheme does not seem to apply at all to the street vendors evicted by the NDMC in Jahangirpuri.
Thus, the eviction of street vendors in Jahangirpuri without provision of notice violates provisions of the Street Vendors Act. It may also violate the right to occupation under Article 19(1)(g), unless it can be shown that the eviction was carried out under another legislation that lays down reasonable restrictions on the right. I therefore turn to the DMC Act.
The DMC Act should not apply
S 322 of the DMC Act permits removals without notice of stalls. This is similar to the provision challenged in Olga Tellis. In that case, the constitutionality of s 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was challenged under Article 21, because it permitted the removal of any ‘object or structure or fixture’ without provision of notice. To uphold the vires of the provision, the Supreme Court interpreted the power of removal without notice narrowly, holding that notice must ordinarily be provided, and can be dispensed with only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ involving ‘urgency’. It held that the State carries the burden to show urgency whenever it uses its powers to dispense with notice and hearing.
In similar vein, if s 322 of the DMC Act is to be constitutionally valid, it must meet the requirements of the right to occupation under Article 19(1)(g). As stated above, any restriction to the right to occupation must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘in the interest of the general public’ to meet the requirements of 19(6). In Sodan Singh, Justice Kuldip Singh observed in his concurring opinion that, ‘the skeletal provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957… can hardly provide any regulatory measures to the enormous and complicated problem of street trading in these areas.’ Both the majority opinion and Justice Kuldip Singh required the state to devise an appropriate law, and in the meantime, appropriate rules regulating street trading. The requirement of framing an appropriate legislation to regulate street vending was reiterated by the Supreme Court in several cases (Gainda Ram (2010); Maharashtra Hawkers Ekta Union (2013)). In Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union, the Supreme Court noted that the Street Vendors Act, when passed, could prove to be such legislation to regulate street vending.
We should conclude from these developments that the provisions of the Street Vendors Act, rather than the skeletal provisions of the DMC Act, ought to apply in case of eviction of street vendors. The Supreme Court was never satisfied that the skeletal provisions of the DMC Act or other municipal acts fulfilled the requirements of Article 19(6), as a law that reasonably regulates the right to street vending. Hence the NDMC ought not to be able to use s 322 of the DMC Act to evict street vendors without notice. Rather, s 322 of the DMC Act ought to be read along with the requirements of the Street Vendors Act, to retain the validity of the provision.
The result is that the demolition of street vending stalls in Jahangirpuri by the NDMC without notice, hearing and relocation as per the Street Vendors Act, violates constitutional and statutory requirements.
The importance of notice, hearing and meaningful engagement
Notice, hearing, meaningful engagement, and other such ‘procedural’ requirements ought not to be dismissed as a mere formality. Rather, these further substantive values. In my PhD, I argue that providing an opportunity for rights holders to participate in decisions that impact their rights, respects their freedom, dignity and substantive equality. In the eviction context, it respects the freedom as capabilities of residents and street vendors to determine and pursue what they have reason to value in respect of their housing and source of livelihood. It respects their dignity in a non-instrumental sense, as beings with inherent worth, rather than as mere objects to be used for the benefit of others.
These procedural requirements also form an important means for rights holders to define the content of their rights, such as housing and access to livelihood. It enables residents and street vendors to directly engage with the state regarding what they require from their housing and livelihood. These entitlement may also be pragmatically important for rights-holders to retain access to housing and livelihood in the face of evictions. For example, Rao-Cavale indicates through his field work that street vendors have used their entitlement to notice and hearing prior to eviction as a means to retain access to spaces for street vending.
Overall, there is much scope to imagine these entitlements in a powerful and substantive sense, so that residents and street vendors, as well as other rights holders in other contexts, are able to decide the shape and content of their own rights through processes of hearings and meaningful engagement. In Gautam Bhatia’s words (draft on file with the author), perhaps this can fulfil the vision of the preamble to the Indian Constitution, which envisages constitutional rights as something We the People give to ourselves.